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# Scenarios for the cultural sector of the future

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Cover illustration: *Stjernekamp* — the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth, but with low support for collective solutions.
Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

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# Foreword by Arts Council Norway

When Arts Council Norway first started working on Scenarios for the cultural sector of the future, we had no idea what 2020 had in store for us. Large segments of the cultural sector lost most of their income more or less overnight on 12 March.
The restrictions imposed in the spring of 2020 have yet to be lifted, and society will likely feel the effects of this pandemic for a long time to come.
Future prospects have now changed so dramatically for so many in this sector in just one year, that there is every reason to strengthen Arts Council Norway's strategic preparedness.

We have prepared this report in collaboration with Economics Norway, with feedback from representatives for the sector, and we have envisioned how Norwegian society and our cultural sector may look 15 years from now. Working with scenarios as a method entails creating visions of the future. In this case, we have developed scenario narratives on the cultural sector in 2035. The four scenarios presented do not necessarily reflect the most likely or most desirable outcome, but they should be relevant and based on analyses of factors of change in society. The report was prepared in the midst of the pandemic, and it reflects on the effects of the pandemic. Nevertheless, we have opted to devote the majority of our attention to other driving forces we believe will characterize tomorrow's cultural sector.

The scenarios have been developed to inspire and promote strategic discussions, both among participants and institutions in the cultural sector itself, and in the discourse on cultural policy.
We encourage you to implement the scenarios.

We are looking forward to the debate on the direction Norwegian cultural life may take in the years to come. How will the Norwegian economy be affected by reduced oil revenues? Will the population still support the government allocating considerable funds to arts and culture? What are the responsibilities and roles of the government in cultural policy, and how much will private donations affect the sector? Will digital expressions of art soon overshadow their analogue counterparts? How will increased diversity in voices and backgrounds affect the public discourse? Will we see greater freedom of expression and more tolerance, or will we increasingly speak to and with others who think like we do? These are some of the many questions we seek to answer as we attempt to look ahead into the future.

The outlook is grim for many in the cultural sector right now, but it is the responsibility of Arts Council Norway to look ahead and hope for a brighter tomorrow. We hope our scenario analyses are a good starting point for people to reflect on the possibilities and challenges of the cultural sector of the future. This may be a good opportunity to look at the big picture and move forward together.

I would like to thank all of our workshop participants for their dedication and feedback on our scenario analyses, and the project team, which has led Arts Council Norway's work on this report. The project team comprised Mari Johansen, Andreas Skauen Pedersen, Birgitte Solbu and Project Manager Ellen Aslaksen.

Arts Council Norway would also like to thank Economics Norway for collaborating with us, and the steering group for the project for their invaluable contributions. The steering group comprised Kristin Karlsrud Haugse from the Norwegian Digitalisation Agency, and Annelene Svingen, Mariann Komissar and Renate Enemark Bergersen from Arts Council Norway's administration.

**Kristin Danielsen**
Executive Director, Arts Council Norway

# Foreword

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic extraordinarily altered the premise for all cultural activity. The immediate effects of the pandemic have been, and continue to be, dramatic for the Norwegian cultural sector. We need to figure out what "our new normal" will entail, and to which societal changes participants in the cultural sector have to adapt.
This report presents four scenario narratives for Norway's cultural sector in 2035. The report was written in the midst of the pandemic, but we have tried to look past its effects.

This report has been prepared by Economics Norway on behalf of Arts Council Norway and developed in close dialogue with the cultural sector. Economics Norway and Arts Council Norway organized two workshops and carried out exploratory interviews as part of their work on this report. The workshops and interviews are key sources of data and we would like to thank all who contributed.

In preparing this report, we have maintained close communication with Arts Council Norway's project team, comprising Ellen Aslaksen, Mari Johansen, Andreas Skauen Pedersen and Birgitte Solbu. We would like to also thank the project team for working so closely with us on the execution of the workshops, as well as for their valuable insights and contributions throughout the project period.

*Oslo, 28 January 2021*

**Rolf Røtnes**
Project Manager, Economics
Norway

# Contents

# Summary

Culture has always been a part of social life — in good times as well as in times of crisis. Culture can be entertaining, beautiful or provocative. Either way, people gravitate toward cultural expressions for a sense of community, for speech and for reflection, and also to better understand both themselves and society. Art and culture promote, shape and strengthen community, and a rich cultural life is seen as a cornerstone of a well-functioning democracy.

We expect the population to continue to seek out cultural expressions and attend cultural events when we are eventually able to put the pandemic behind us. But there are myriad different cultural expressions and activities competing for the audience's time and attention.

People's pursuit and consumption of culture is in part met by Norway's cultural sector. The sector covers cultural workers, institutions and arenas that facilitate the production, knowledge, protection, dissemination and accessibility of art, cultural expressions, cultural experiences and cultural heritage. Sector participants operate in a mixed economy, where volunteerism, the market economy and public grants all work together.

Economic constraints imposed by cultural policy are expected to greatly affect developments in the Norwegian cultural sector in the years to come. This includes the sector's ability to accommodate the public's preferences and willingness to pay. The ability to utilize new technology is a factor here. An ageing population, increasing centralization and Norwegian society's ability to adapt to emission targets and climate changes could also affect the sector.

We have prepared this scenario analysis to provide Arts Council Norway and the cultural sector with a shared foundation for strategic discussions on key driving forces we expect will affect the sector in the years to come.

The cultural sector has its own dynamic, but it will nevertheless be affected by societal driving forces affecting Norwegian society in general. We discuss these central societal driving forces in this report. The report includes four scenario narratives, illustrating how Norwegian society and the Norwegian cultural sector may look in 2035. We have prepared these four narratives by combining two driving forces, which, we expect, will have considerable implications for the sector in the years to come, and which are associated with genuine uncertainty.

One such driving force is the Norwegian economy. After years of strong growth in the Norwegian economy, prospects are more uncertain than they have been in a long time. Among other things, this uncertainty is linked to future productivity developments, investments in and profit from petroleum-based activities, the shift to a low-emission society, and health and care costs. These factors help determine whether the government and private households will have more or less economic and financial freedom in the years to come.

In a future with a relatively strong economic growth, Norway will have many organizations adapting to new, global market opportunities. Internationally competitive organizations and industries often characterized by high elements of technology and knowledge. In a future with strong economic growth, we assume that a relatively large share of activities — in the economy in general and in the cultural sector in particular — will take place in and around cities, and in industries and organizations with a high wage paying capacity.

In a future with a less strong economic development, relatively speaking, we assume that more people will be engaged in activities, organizations and industries with a somewhat lower wage paying capacity. One characteristic of this type of development would be that services requiring little or no formal education make up a somewhat larger share of the economy. We also envision that industry and settlement patterns will be more widely distributed geographically.

The second driving force is sociocultural, reflecting the tension between the community and the individual. The population's average preference for collective solutions may change and move in either direction.

In a future where people have a high acceptance of collective solutions, we assume that most would support such solutions being used to meet societal challenges, fund collective goods, ensure social equalization and protect the welfare state. We assume that public allocations of funds for cultural purposes are relatively large and that the cultural sector generally supports formal or informal collective agreements.

In scenarios with "low acceptance of collective solutions", the government will assume less responsibility for income protection and funding of collective goods, like culture. Cultural workers and the public will both, to a larger degree, base their decisions on personal considerations.

Nevertheless, we expect the population to seek out other people for a sense of community, but we expect that people will primarily be drawn to people and environments that are similar to themselves, or to people and environments they want to be associated with.

Different combinations of these two driving forces have given rise to four scenario narratives, which we have called *Lykkeland, Stjernekamp, Vestavind* and *Himmelblå*, see Figure 1. These four narratives are named after Norwegian TV productions, whose titles literally translate as *State of Happiness, Battle of the stars, Western Winds*, and *Blue skies,* respectively.

↘ Figure 1 – Scenariokryss




Source: Economics Norway


*Lykkeland*. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

## Lykkeland

*Lykkeland* is the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth and high support for collective solutions. In *Lykkeland*, Norway has a high income level, a highly educated population and a large but digitalized and centralized public sector. The government assumes an active role in cultural policy and strictly complies with a goal that 1.5 percent of public sector costs will be allocated to cultural purposes. Cultural policy aims to make culture accessible to most people. Considerations of the creative abilities of artists and individuals are also emphasized, but usually this will usually be confined to speeches. The cultural sector is composed of a relatively large number of professional cultural workers. People appreciate a wide variety of cultural offerings — even if they don't always have the time to take advantage of them. The large cities have a vital cultural scene, whereas cultural offerings in more sparsely populated areas are far more limited. The government and the cultural sector actively work to find solutions that are both competitive and mindful of the objectives framed out in cultural policy. One example is the hugely successful *Leselyst*, a digital, joint Nordic platform, where all new literature is recorded and made available as audio books. Norway is also widely acknowledged as a world leader in protecting our shared cultural heritage, even though many smaller museums and local cultural centres have been closed after years of dwindling patronage and recruitment problems.




*Stjernekamp*. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

## Stjernekamp

*Stjernekamp* is the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth, but with low support for collective solutions. In *Stjernekamp*, every individual is the architect of their own fortune, and Norway is characterized by industry-friendly policies and low taxes. Popular culture is relatively important, and most of the consumption of culture takes place on international platforms. There are some groups with a high willingness to pay, who pursue technical brilliance and uniqueness, and who are happy to spend money on artistic expressions that support their identity and position in society. Norway has few professional cultural workers, but several artists and organizations are internationally renowned and do well financially. Most institutions offer tours and performances using virtual technology — but the institutions' revenues also depend on audiences attending performances, shows and events in person. Cultural policy is not at the forefront of social discourse. Artists and other cultural workers who cannot sustain themselves on the income provided have already found alternative careers, and applications to arts education dwindle year by year.


*Vestavind*. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

## Vestavind

*Vestavind* is the story of a Norway characterized by many years of weak economic growth, and where acceptance of collective solutions is low. There is significant polarization along many different dimensions, and trust in authorities and other people is lower than it has been for a long time. Many people find community in culture, and art is a key outlet for social criticism, but cultural consumption in the form of attendance in person at paid-for cultural events is generally low. Few people take the time or can afford to seek out cultural events, and many do not find cultural expressions produced in Norway particularly relevant. The creative power is considerable, but the government does not have an active cultural policy, and the incomes of cultural workers and cultural institutions vary considerably. Most artists and cultural workers are self-employed, and artists find their audience or supporters among like-minded individuals in physical or digital spaces. Several cultural institutions focus on other content than paid cultural activities, and private investors play a relatively large role in the funding of cultural production. Public spending in the cultural sector varies considerably from region to region. As an example, the degree to which libraries prioritize purchasing new books varies considerably.


*Himmelblå*. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

## Himmelblå

*Himmelblå* is the story of a Norway where economic growth has been and remains weak, whereas acceptance of collective solutions is high. In *Himmelblå*, society is characterized by the population's pursuit of what many call "the good life". The cultural audience is relatively large, but few can afford the most expensive cultural activities. Personal development, care for one's local community and family life rank high on most people's list of priorities. The government has assumed a special responsibility for income protection and national infrastructure. Among other things, universal basic income has been introduced. The cultural sector is primarily characterized by the many amateur artists whose main source of income is universal basic income. Their number equals that of professional cultural workers. Cultural workers live and work all over the country. Cultural offerings are diverse, popular and locally-oriented. In every region, cultural centres, libraries and museums are arenas where cultural activities take place. There are considerable regional differences, however. Large, expensive cultural programmes and projects are a thing of the past. National institutions are funded by the government, while the country's 13 regions are responsible for museum administration, cultural heritage conservation and regional theatres and arenas. Some critics question the quality of Norwegian art and cultural production. Most cultural workers, however, believe it is important to protect universal basic income, which gives everyone equal opportunities for artistic expression.

# Chapter 1
# Background and methods

## Purpose

Arts Council Norway has appointed Economics Norway (EN) to conduct a scenario analysis.

The coronavirus pandemic has created an unexpected and dramatic situation for the cultural sector. There is a need to determine what "the new normal" may entail for the sector, and to provide Arts Council Norway and the sector with a shared platform for discussions about the future and the need to adapt and reorganize.

In this report, we discuss central driving forces we expect will shape the cultural sector in the years to come. While the ongoing pandemic forms a dramatic backdrop for the execution of this project, this report emphasizes more long-term driving forces.

The report presents four scenario narratives on the Norwegian cultural sector in 2035. These scenario narratives do not necessarily reflect the most likely or most desirable outcome, but are intended to provide a shared point of departure for strategic discussions between Arts Council Norway and the cultural sector on the choices the sector is currently facing.

This report can be seen as a supplement to other analyses and reports concerning the Norwegian cultural sector, especially recent reports addressing the immediate effects of the pandemic.

## Definitions and concepts

Culture is not a clearly defined concept. Consequently, there is no clear definition of what, or who, is part of the cultural sector. In a broader sense, culture can encompass almost all interpersonal interaction and social structures. At the other extreme is the narrow, sector-oriented concept of culture, which covers a specific area of social life, where certain forms of expression are subject to some degree of artistic processing. In this report, we have applied a sector-oriented approach, limiting our focus to the following cultural segments:

- literature
- music
- dramatic art
- visual art
- museums and cultural heritage

This delimitation means we have not considered films and video games, architecture, fashion or design. Nor have we addressed advertising, the media or sports.

Nevertheless, our analysis focuses on driving forces that may also affect these other segments of culture, as well as society in general.

We have focused primarily on the professional segment of the cultural sector, while being fully aware that cultural life also includes a wide range of people who actively produce cultural expressions in their free time, voluntarily and without compensation, and that many volunteer workers are essential in executing cultural events. Whenever paid and unpaid cultural work intersect, and we have found it relevant, we have pointed this out in the scenario narratives.

In this report, we have used the term *cultural worker* as an umbrella term for artists, employees of cultural institutions (for example, libraries, museums and theatres), including administrative staff, producers, sound and lighting technicians, directors, stage staff, etc., as well as employees engaged in specialized distribution of the cultural expressions mentioned above.

This definition of cultural worker does not include employees of national or local cultural administrations, industry organizations or other organizations representing cultural workers.

The term *artist* is defined as an individual engaged in professional artistic activity.

References to the number of cultural workers or artists are based on internationally recognized industry nomenclature, which is also applied by Statistics Norway, and the number of people whose main occupation, either through self-employment or as an employee, is in organizations within these segments. See Table 5 in Appendix 1.

## Work process and reporting structure

The scenario analysis has been prepared in consultation with participants in the cultural sector. As part of this process, we have conducted the following activities:

- Economics Norway prepared a discussion note on the driving forces we expect will affect the sector in the years to come. This note was based on central documents describing the Norwegian social development and the cultural sector in Norway, as well as ten exploratory interviews with employees from different sections of Arts Council Norway. A revised version of this background document is included in Chapter 3.
- In consultation with Arts Council Norway, we invited a selection of resource persons to two workshops to discuss how Norway and the sector may look 15 years into the future. The topic for the first workshop was identifying relevant and uncertain driving forces expected to affect the sector in the years to come. The topic for the second workshop was to envision how the sector may look in four different futures. Lists of participants in both workshops are included in Appendix 2.
- Economics Norway has, based on its own analyses and workshop discussions, prepared four scenario narratives, describing how the cultural sector may look in 2035. These narratives are presented in Chapter 5, whereas differences between scenarios are explored further in Chapter 6.

# Chapter 2 Norway’s cultural sector

Norway’s cultural sector covers cultural workers, institutions and arenas that facilitate the production, knowledge, protection, dissemination and accessibility of art, cultural expressions, cultural experiences and cultural heritage. The cultural sector encompasses organizations of different types, operating under very different conditions and in very different contexts.

The social value of the cultural sector is linked to the enjoyment and benefit of private individuals, but also to the way in which the sector affects interaction and community. Good artistic and cultural experiences may benefit individuals by, among other things, engaging, moving, provoking and entertaining them, and cultural workers may find satisfaction in the creation of cultural expressions. On a societal level, the cultural sector builds community and provides arenas for discussion of and critical reflection on both our past and contemporary society (Meld. St. 8 (2018–2019)).

Furthermore, cultural expressions are also a reflection of how history and symbolism are used to strengthen identity and reputation standing. Cultural events, celebrations and commemorations serve as arenas where people can meet and traditions can be shared. In this way, culture may also promote improved physical and mental health, learning, socialization and integration, as well as criticism and discussion.

The cultural sector also generates economic value for society. In 2018, the part of the cultural sector that forms the focus of this project had a turnover of approximately NOK 39 billion (Menon, 2020a).[1] This accounted for just under one percent of total production in Mainland Norway.[2] Literature and music are the cultural segments with the highest turnover, followed by dramatic art.
Below that, we find museums and cultural heritage (Menon, 2020a).

A characteristic feature of the cultural sector is that its participants operate in a mixed economy, where volunteerism, audience revenues (ticket sales, fees, performances, etc.) and public grants work together.

In what follows we provide a description of the sector from the perspectives of cultural policy, cultural institutions, cultural workers and audiences. This description serves as an introduction to the discussion of the driving forces and the scenario narratives.

1 The definition of the cultural field formulated by Menon (2020a) corresponds to the delimitations applied in this report, with the exception that Menon chose to include certain organizations from other segments.

2 In our presentation, we include only the segments covered by Arts Council Norway’s portfolio.

## Cultural policy

The long-term objective for the national cultural policy is described in the most recent white paper on culture, The Power of Culture, Meld. St. 8 (2018–2019). This objective is included in text box 1. Among other things, the white paper stipulates that cultural policy should promote production of artistic and cultural expressions of the highest quality, make culture available to everyone, and safeguard and disseminate tangible and intangible cultural heritage now and for the future (Meld. St. 8 (2018–2019)).

Cultural policy should also promote critical reflection. The white paper emphasizes that cultural policy, along with media, education and research policies, must support Article 100, paragraph 6, of the Constitution[3], which stipulates that “The authorities of the state shall create conditions that facilitate open and enlightened public discourse.”

↘ Text box 1: National cultural policy objectives

### Societal objectives

A vibrant democracy where all citizens are free to express themselves, and where diversity, creative power and creativity are highly valued. An inclusive society where art and culture of the highest quality inspire, unite us and teach us about ourselves and our surroundings.

General cultural policy objectives

A free and independent cultural sector that

- produces artistic and cultural expressions of the highest quality
- fosters education and critical reflection
- protects and disseminates cultural heritage
- creates and disseminates a cultural offering that is viewed as relevant, and which represents the population
- is available to everyone and encourages each person to experience and participate in cultural activities
- provides meeting places and builds communities
- transforms itself and shows an ability to transform
- has an international impact and fosters intercultural understanding
- strengthens the Norwegian language, the Sami languages, the national minority languages, and the Norwegian sign language as fundamental bearers of culture

Source: Meld. St. 8 (2018 -2019 The Power of Culture

3 The white paper on culture refers to this as the “infrastructure requirement”.

National cultural policy is based on culture being a common good. It is also based on an acknowledgement that the market alone cannot sufficiently fund the desired breadth of art and cultural offerings in Norway.

Certain types of artistic and cultural offerings would not exist without public funding. By partially funding culture as a common good, authorities assume responsibility for distribution, whereas production may be both public and private (Ibenholt et al., 2015).

The Ministry of Culture has overall responsibility for cultural policy, but national, regional and local authorities all support production, art dissemination and the construction, maintenance and operation of cultural buildings. Exact figures for public spending on arts and culture cannot be derived from any one statistic, but Statistics Norway estimates that total costs allocated under Ministry of Culture's budgets, as well as by counties and municipalities, were approximately NOK 20 billion in 2019 (Statistics Norway, 2020; Prop. 1 S (2018–2019), 2018–2019; Statistics Norway, 2020c), see Figure 3. This total does not include lottery funds from Norsk Tipping, which are also shown in the figure, or allocations made by the Sami Parliament of Norway. Based on these data, we can determine that allocations have increased by NOK 2 billion at 2019 value since 2015, which represents an increase of 2.9 percent per year for the period.

National allocations include grants to institutions, grants and guaranteed income for artists, government remuneration and various support schemes. This type of grants are made on the basis of professional and artistic quality and in accordance with the objectives outlined above.

The year before the pandemic hit, just over NOK 8.5 billion of the Ministry of Culture's total budget of NOK 15 billion were earmarked for cultural purposes. Approximately half of the Ministry of Culture's allocations for art and cultural purposes are distributed to music and dramatic art institutions (NOK 2.9 billion) and museums (NOK 1.8 billion).

Some NOK 1.2 billion are managed by various agencies affiliated with Arts Council Norway, whose purpose is to promote diverse contemporary artistic and cultural expressions and contribute to the creation, protection, documentation and dissemination of art and culture.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Culture allocated just under NOK 600 million for grants, guaranteed income and national compensation schemes[4] in 2019. National compensation scheme allocations are distributed to various funds, managed by authorized copyright organizations (TONO, BONO, Kopinor and Norwaco, among others), who, in turn, distributed these funds to the artists (copyright holders). The copyright organizations also collect payment for other uses, beyond what is covered by national compensation schemes.

Furthermore, national allocations also included allocations for language, literature and library purposes, archival purposes, buildings and public spaces and general cultural purposes, equivalent to a total of NOK 2 billion.

4 The Norwegian government pays annual collective compensation for Norwegian works lent out for use by public agencies and institutions.

↘ Figure 2 – National, county and municipal allocations[1]) for cultural purposes[2]) in NOK billion (2019 value)[3])




Sources: Statistics Norway (2020) Table 12163 and Table 12362, St.meld. 1 (2019–2020)
1) Figures for county and municipal spending are based on net operating costs, cf. accounting guide to KOSTRA (Municipality-State-Reporting), published on 15 March 2020.
2) The figures do not include allocations under items marked sports, cultural monuments and/or media, but some items may nevertheless include allocations to, for example, film and media, including allocations for operations and administration.
3) Figure adjusted for changes in the consumer price index

County authority and municipal spending on culture was NOK 2.4 billion and NOK 9.6 billion, respectively, in 2019 (Statistics Norway, 2020). County authorities fund cultural activities and museum and cultural dissemination, among other things. Municipalities have a special responsibility for funding public libraries and culture schools, but also allocate funds for museums, art dissemination, grants to non-profit organizations, cultural events, etc. Norsk Tipping lottery funds, equivalent to NOK 800 million in 2019, were distributed to The Cultural Schoolbag, *Frifond* [5], project and development funds and the gift reinforcement programme, among other things.

Many cultural institutions receive both regional and national grants and allocations. Public support for museums, for example, totalled NOK 4.2 billion in 2019 (Arts Council Norway, 2020).

Other central instruments of cultural policy include laws and agreements concerning copyright management and tax policies. In addition, cultural policy intersects with many other policy areas. In particular, cultural policy intersects with policies on volunteerism, industry, media, foreign affairs, the environment and education and research, which means that instruments from other policies may affect the cultural sector and vice versa.

The overall parameters governing cultural policy remain relatively stable, but different governments do put their own stamp on the policy through reforms and new schemes. In 2014, for example, a gift reinforcement programme was implemented.

5 Frifond is a funding scheme for children and youth organizations, financed by the Ministry of Culture and proceeds from the Norwegian national lottery.

This programme entails that monetary donations from private donors to art and cultural activities in Norway are reinforced; recipients receive an additional sum equivalent to 25 percent of the private donation. Originally, the programme was confined to museums, but it was expanded in 2016 to include music, literature, dramatic art, visual art and cultural institutions. A further example is the government's 2017 strategic focus on cultural and creative activity, aimed at promoting growth, value creation and job opportunities in creative industries.[6] The funds allocated for this programme are managed by Arts Council Norway, Innovation Norway and Norwegian Arts Abroad [7], and grants are based primarily on commercial potential (Hauge et al., 2019).

## Cultural institutions

Norway has a wide range of institutions, arenas and platforms for the production and dissemination of culture. Cultural institutions may be public or private, and they may be more or less associated with a permanent location. Some cultural institutions are publicly owned and operated, and some are private, and many cultural institutions receive national, regional and private funding, in addition to their audience income.

The exact number of cultural institutions in Norway would, among other things, depend on how the term cultural institution is defined. If the term is defined as any organization registered as a limited liability company or similar organizational structures (excluding sole proprietorships) with more than one employee, the sector included a little over 4000 cultural institutions in 2018 (Menon, 2020a). Around 900 of these are in the literature segment (publishers, libraries, houses of literature, etc.), 1600 are in the music segment (record labels, venues, sound studios, etc.), 500 in the dramatic art segment (theatres, etc.), 400 in the museum and cultural heritage segment, and 800 in the visual art segment.

However, it is not unusual for the term cultural institution to be reserved for institutions that have received grants from the government or other donors. For example, the music and dramatic art segment included 42 institutions in Arts Council Norway's mapping. These had a total of 2,471,000 patrons in 2018. The national museum network, i.e. museums funded by the Ministry of Culture, currently includes 61 consolidated museum units. These have a total annual visitor count of approximately 6.7 million (Ministry of Culture, 2019). In addition to museums in the national museum network, we have museums with other sources of funding, including municipal museums, university museums and museums funded by other ministries. In total, there are 102 museums in Norway (Arts Council Norway, 2020).

Norwegian libraries include the National Library, which is owned by the government, county libraries, which are owned by county authorities, and 647 public libraries, which are owned by the municipalities. The latter had approximately 24 million visitors in 2019 (Statistics Norway, 2020e).

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6 The programme has been made subject to normative process research, see Hauge et al. (2019) Nullpunktanalyse Kulturell og kreativ næring.

7 The Norwegian Arts Abroad network consists of the Performing Arts Hub Norway, Office for Contemporary Arts, the Norwegian Film Institute, Norwegian Crafts, Music Norway, Design and Architecture Norway (DOGA), and Norwegian Literature Abroad.

The Norwegian National Opera and Ballet, the National Library and the National Theatre are Norway's largest cultural institutions measured by number of employees, and also among the largest by public grants (Prop. 1 S, 2020–2021), see Table 1. For the institutions on this list, public grants make up well over half of their overall income in 2019. The institutions listed in this table are not representative of Norwegian cultural institutions in general, but have been included as indication of the significance of public funding for cultural institutions.

↘ Table 1 – Income by public grants, ticket sales and other sources of income for the five cultural institutions that were the largest recipients of public grants in 2019.

| | Employees | Public grants (in NOK mill.) | Ticket sales (in NOK mill.) | Other income (in NOK mill.) | Visitors (in NOK 1000) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Norwegian National Opera and Ballet | 668 | 641 | 104 | 62 | 369 |
| National Library | 424 (FTE) | 558 | | 40 | 34 |
| National Theatre | 372 | 206 | 60 | 17 | 249 |
| Det Norske Theatre | 331 | 181 | 75 | 14 | 280 |
| National Museum of Art, Architecture and Design[1] | 284 | 522 | 4 (22 in 2018) | 18 | 159 |
| Oslo Philharmonic | 138 | 168 | 20 | 21 | 232 |

Sources: Annual reports for 2019 for each of the institutions listed, as well as www.proff.no
[1)] The museum has been closed temporarily since 14 January 2019

## Cultural workers

In this report, the term cultural worker is used to describe professional artists, employees of cultural institutions (for example , libraries, museums and theatres), including administrative staff, producers, sound and lighting technicians, directors, stage staff, etc., as well as employees engaged in specialized distribution of cultural expressions mentioned above.

If we examine public employment statistics and apply our segment delimitation from Chapter 1, the professional cultural sector employs some 32,000 people, see Figure 3 and Appendix 1. Employment figures may vary somewhat from other reports as a result of different segment delimitation.[8] The figure for employed individuals includes both employees and self-employed individuals (owners) of private and public enterprises (including sole proprietorships), registered in Norway.

The cultural sector includes a much higher proportion of self-employed individuals (contractors) and atypical affiliations (freelancers and temporary employees) than is commonly found in the rest of the labour force (Jesnes & Neergaard, 2019). The employment figure above does not include persons who only work in the sector some of the time or part-time, nor does it include persons who live in Norway, but who are employed by enterprises registered outside Norway. Based on employment statistics

8 For example, Menon (2020a) estimated that total employment in the sector was 36,000 in 2018. This report applies the same sector delimitation as Menon, but they also included select organizations from other segments, whose primary activities correspond to Arts Council Norway's definition for the sector.

and the difference between the number of employment contracts and the number of employees, we estimate that an additional 5,000–6,000 people a year have part-time or temporary employment in the segments covered by this report.

These figures do not include amateurs or volunteers. Figures from the Centre for Research on Civil Society and Voluntary Sector (Vollebæk, 2018) show that close to two out of three Norwegians engage in some form of volunteer work. The voluntary sector plays a vital role in the cultural field, as both a gateway to the field and as a support function in connection with audience events. Approximately two thirds of Norway's cultural institutions use volunteers in their activities (Vollebæk, 2018). Museums rely most heavily on volunteers, but we also find widespread use of volunteers in libraries and music institutions. Archives and visual art institutions rarely rely on volunteers. Statistics Norway estimates that volunteerism in the cultural sector is equivalent to approximately 40,000 FTEs (Statistics Norway, 2020).

Figure 3 shows the distribution of cultural worker employment by segment and activity. As indicated by the diagram on the left, most cultural workers work in the literature segment, followed by the music and dramatic art segment. Please note that employees in the visual art segment are largely artists, as employees of galleries where visual art is displayed would be registered under museums.[9]

↘ Figure 3 – Cultural worker employment by segment and activity[1]




Source: Statistics Norway, register-based employment
1) Figures in acc. with EN's categorization of activities, see Table 7 in Appendix 1. Cultural institutions include museums, theatres, archives and libraries.

The figure above shows that of 32,000 employees, 17,600 are performing or creative artists. Among artists, approximately 8 out of 10 are self-employed. The number of individuals who have a background in art education[10] or who would consider themselves artists, may be higher. Artists classified as employees are primarily

9 Gallery employees are categorized as cultural workers, but would not be included in the number of cultural workers in official statistics, as gallery employees are defined as "Other retail sale of goods in non-specialised stores".

10 This group also includes other specialized stores besides galleries.

employed by theatre and music institutions.

Approximately 5760 are employed by organizations disseminating and distributing art and cultural expressions (primarily music and literature), whereas 8900 are other employees of various cultural institutions (dramatic art and music institutions and libraries). The latter group includes administrative staff, producers, lighting and sound technicians, directors, stage workers, etc.

People employed in the two latter categories are primarily employees. The income of artists is characterized by many activities being project-based. This means uncertain and relatively low incomes and a weaker real income growth than other segments of the economy[11], even though there are considerable differences between industries and types of affiliation. Permanent employees often have higher incomes than self-employed individuals (Jesnes & Neergaard, 2019). Visual artists, composers and authors are classified as creative artists. Musicians and actors are performing artists, performing their own work and the work of others in a wide range of different distribution channels: on stage, in TV and radio, at festivals and private events, etc. According to Menon (2020a), the creative segment usually have the lowest incomes. We find the lowest levels of income among visual artists, followed by authors, whereas actors and musicians earn a somewhat higher income.

Statistics Norway's employment statistics show an increase in the number of cultural workers over the past few years (1.7 percent per year for the period 2015–2019), which is higher than the national average (1.1 percent for the same period). The growth has been particularly strong among artists and employees of dramatic art institutions, whereas there has been a decrease in the number of employees working in literature distribution and bookshops, see Appendix 1.
Potential explanations for this increase in employment include strong growth in the Norwegian economy, combined with developments in education and increased public funding for cultural purposes.

The strong growth in employment, combined with weak income growth, may indicate that more people want to work in the sector than the sector has "room" (or market) for. The reason for this is likely due to the fact that people's motivations for working in this sector are not monetary. But cultural workers, too, need an income to support themselves and practice their art, and, as we have seen, many cultural workers therefore combine artistic and non-artistic activities. Furthermore, this type of patchwork economy means that many cultural workers spend a great deal of time securing their employment and income.[12]

## Audience

The most recent survey of consumer expenditure (Statistics Norway, 2012) indicated that the average household spends approximately 10 percent of its consumption expenditure on recreation and culture, which is on a par with the share spent on food

11 See, e.g. Kleppe et al. (2010) Kunstnerisk arbeid i utøvende kunstinstitusjoner, Skarstein et al. (2016) Kunstens autonomi og økonomi, Heian, M.T., Løyland, K. and Kleppe B. (2015) Kunstnerundersøkelsen 2013.

12 See, e.g. Jesnes and Neergaard (2019) Kunst og kultur – organisasjoner i endring.

and non-alcoholic beverages (approximately 12 percent).
The survey of consumer expenditure, which is a survey Statistics Norway has conducted many times, indicates that the share of household income spent on food and beverages has decreased for several decades, whereas the share spent on recreation and culture has increased. When population numbers also rise, this trend will be reflected in increased turnover (and employment) in the cultural sector, something the turnover figures also reflect.

We see the same trend reflected in the figures on overall household expenditure in the national budget. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Norwegian household expenditure on cultural activities increased more than incomes, which led the share of overall consumption expenditure to increase, see Figure 4. It is worth noting that Norwegian households enjoyed a marked income increase in the period 1980–2019. Expenditures for food and beverages have decreased steadily. Since 2000, the increase in household expenditures on culture has been somewhat lower than increases in income. In comparison, household expenditures on foreign travel, accommodation and restaurants have also increased faster than household income over the past forty years. The growth was particularly strong after the first decade of the 2000s. This could indicate that consumption of leisure activities and cultural services in Norway is to some extent being replaced with consumption abroad.

↘ Figure 4 – Total household expenditures on selected consumption categories as a share of the household's overall consumption expenditures.




Source: Statistics Norway, National accounts

Statistics Norway regularly surveys the population's interest in various cultural services. The Norwegian Cultural Barometer indicates that a majority of the population has an interest in books, concerts, festivals and cinema. Sports events come in addition to this, and we have not taken this into account here, see Figure 5. The segment interested in opera and ballet is smaller. Interests are also reflected in actual usage.

Surveys of interests and actual usage indicate that most cultural services are used by a much higher percentage of women than men. Furthermore, the share of cultural service users increases with increased education and income levels (Statistics Norway, 2020a). Interest in cultural services is also closely related to age. Interest in opera and art exhibitions increase as people get older, whereas interest in cinema, sports events and cultural festivals decrease with age. Cultural use surveys indicate that many people who report no interest in various cultural expressions nevertheless make use of cultural services to some degree. This may be related to cultural events also serving as social meeting grounds. Norwegian and international surveys indicate that people who are interested in one cultural service, are also often interested in other services. We also find that among those who have not participated in any cultural services, lack of interest is a much more important explanation than other factors, such as price (European Commission, 2020; Statistics Norway, 2016).

Compared to other European countries, Norway, along with Denmark and Sweden, is nevertheless among the countries reporting the highest interest as well as actual use (European Commission, 2020).

↘ Figure 5 – Share of people responding that they are "very interested" or "fairly interested" in various cultural services (left).
Average use in past 12 months (right).




Source: Norwegian Cultural Barometer, Statistics Norway (2020a), Tables 05299 and 05286 Note: Data missing for visitors to cultural festivals in 2000.

Statistics Norway's cultural barometer also indicates that the share of the population responding that they are very or fairly interested, has decreased slightly since 2000 for most categories. The exception is ballet, where the share has increased slightly, though from a very low level. The decrease is most marked for cinemas, which is also reflected in recent usage figures. Visits to Norwegian cinemas decreased from approximately 13 million in 2016 to 11 million in 2019 (Statistics Norway, Table 11817).

This decline in interest and use, as indicated by the figures above, has come about despite an increasingly wide selection of culture and cultural expressions in Norway (as indicated by the growth in employment in the sector). We interpret this as cultural consumption not simply being a matter of financial resources, but that time, availability and preferences also play a role.

It would seem that Norwegian cultural consumption is generally relatively high after many years of growth, but that this growth stopped in the 2000s. Since then, the changes from year to year have been relatively moderate. This stabilization is also reflected in household consumption figures. The changes from year to year are relatively minor, but show a moderate decrease or "shift" to consumption abroad or in the home — for example from cinema to streaming services.

# Chapter 3
# What will shape the cultural sector in the years to come?

This chapter discusses various driving forces based on areas such as policy and legislation, economics and demographics, sociocultural conditions, technological development, and climate and the environment.[13] Some driving forces affect all aspects of Norwegian society. Others are more specific to the cultural sector. The chapter also includes questions discussed in workshops and issues that may provide relevant starting points for further discussions.

## Policy and legislation

The cultural sector is affected by changes in international and national policy and by legislation. The establishment of a wide range of international organizations and trade agreements after World War II led to increased international cooperation, and international trade and increased movement of people, goods, services, capital and culture across national borders. Globalization has since increased in step with developments in information and communication technology and more efficient international transport.

This has meant easier access to international markets for Norwegian enterprises and exports of Norwegian goods, such as oil and fish. At the same time, we now have greater and less expensive access to a wide range of imported consumer goods. Many industries have undergone considerable transformations, leading to strong productivity growth and increased competitiveness internationally, but also to closures and the outsourcing of activities in areas in which other countries are more competitive. Globalization has generally led to increased prosperity and increased specialization, both across and within countries.

While many countries, including Norway, have benefited from reduced barriers to trade, we have, especially in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and subsequent European recession, seen signs of resistance to further economic integration in many countries.

The benefits from international trade are sufficiently great for there to be little reason to believe that international trade will cease entirely. However, the international political changes seen in recent years do raise questions of whether the trend of increased international cooperation is reversing. If so, this gives rise to a new type of political uncertainty that will affect us all. We may see changes in the types of goods and services that are traded across national borders, as well as in which countries we interact and cooperate with.

13 This chapter largely corresponds to the background note forwarded to workshop participants, but the wording has been reworked to include feedback and clarifications contributed during the workshops.

For the cultural sector, specifically, legislation and changes to Norwegian policies are highly relevant. The Norwegian Culture Act establishes the general principle that municipalities and county authorities have a responsibility to fund cultural activities. According to Oxford Research (2018), there have been few governments constraints and very little dialogue between our national government and county authorities on ambitions and priorities for regional cultural policies. The county authorities therefore have considerable freedom within the cultural sector, although they are limited by available resources and regional policy priorities.

The Hagen Commission, as it was known, recommended considerable allocations of funds from the Ministry of Culture's budget to the county authorities. The white paper on regional reform, Meld. St. 6 (2018–2019) Oppgaver til nye regioner, recommended that county authorities be assigned greater responsibility for cultural activities, to be specified further in the white paper on culture. The Ministry of Culture has since withdrawn these guidelines, choosing instead to focus on building dialogue between administrative levels on tasks with shared responsibility. In the short term, these changes primarily affect administrative segments, but in the long term, the issue of the distribution of duties in administrative segments may be raised again.

Other legislation may also affect the cultural sector, such as regulations concerning copyright protection and management, including income from such rights. The distribution and consumption of culture has changed, from the purchase of physical goods and experiences, to streaming of cultural content through subscription solutions on digital platforms. As a result, income streams have changed dramatically for many artists and others in the sector. Adaptations, or the lack thereof, in national and international legislation, could change framework conditions for the cultural sector in the years to come — by posing challenges, but also creating opportunities.

## The Norwegian economy

For quite some time, the Norwegian economy has been characterized by growing public sector budgets as a result of strong growth in tax revenue, including petroleum income and returns on the Government Pension Fund Global ("Oil Fund"). All in all, both Norwegian households and our public sector have enjoyed greater financial and economic freedom than most other countries, and the increased prosperity we have seen in recent decades has benefited a majority of the Norwegian population. The oil fund has also provided the economic freedom to cover unforeseen costs in times of crisis. The proposed National Budget for 2020 planned for every eight krone in public sector budgets to be covered by withdrawals from the oil fund, but in reality, these withdrawals were higher, in order to fund emergency measures implemented to handle the effects of the pandemic.

After years of strong growth in the Norwegian economy, prospects are more uncertain than they have been in a long time.

Productivity in the Norwegian mainland economy has decreased in recent years. In order to maintain the same growth in living standards we have become used to over the past 40 years, productivity in the years to come must increase faster than it has for the last decade.

Investments in and revenues from the petroleum sector are also expected to decrease in the years to come. Both of these factors could have implications for Norway's competitiveness, Norwegian jobs, wage growth and tax revenues. As we reduce investments in new and existing wells, activity in enterprises and industries supplying goods and services to the petroleum industry is immediately affected.

Returns on investment decrease as oil wells dry up and consumers the world over begin to prefer other sources of energy. Among other things, this will lead to reduced tax revenues and transfers to the oil fund. Few other industries are expected to offer returns on investment on par with what we have seen in the petroleum sector. Few other industries also provide additional income as a result of the sale of a limited and sought-after natural resource (economic rent).

While petroleum revenue does play a significant role, human capital is Norway's most valuable resource. Norway's employment rates are high, compared to most other OECD countries. One reason for this is that women and those over the age of 55 are part of the labour force. The employment rate is declining, however. Norway's employment rate among men aged 25–54, for example, is not particularly high compared to other OECD countries. In addition, the total number of hours worked per resident is approximately the same as the European average. This is because Norway has relatively short contractually-agreed working hours, generous leaves, high rates of absence due to sickness and widespread part-time employment (Meld. St. 29 (2016–2017)).

Demographic trends also affect the economy. Every other year, Statistics Norway publishes national population projections based on 9 different developmental paths. In the main alternative, the number of people aged 65 or older is expected to increase faster than the number of people aged 24–64, cf. Figure 6. This affects the economy in two different ways:
First, public health expenditures and social security costs will increase. Second, the share of people in the active workforce will decrease.

For some time now, we have seen strong increases in public expenditures related to health and care services. We expect these expenditures will continue to rise as the population ages and life expectancy increases. The population's expectations of and preferences for a robust health care sector are strong, and it is fair to assume that health and care services will remain a priority whatever the future holds, even if some of these services are provided by private entities.

Growth in the health and care services sector is not only a matter of public expenditure — it is also a matter of labour resources. The health and care services sector[14] includes approximately 560,000 employees. This is equivalent to 21 percent of Norway's entire workforce, and a significant share of the Norwegian labour market. Both of these figures are expected to increase in the years to come.[15]

14 Given how the health and care services sector is defined in official statistics, this also includes residential services without care, including the kindergarten sector. Statistics Norway (2020).

15 See, for example, Statistics Norway (2020d), Projections of labour force and employment by education towards 2040, Statistics Norway (2019) Projecting the labour market for personnel in health and care towards 2035, or EN (2018) Helse-Norge 2040 – Hvordan vil framtiden bli?

The combination of a stagnating workforce, reduced returns on investment from the petroleum sector, and increasing health and care services expenditures means increased competition for labour resources and sharper priorities in public sector budgets. Compared to other countries, Norway has a strong public economy as a result of the way in which the oil fund is structured. The fund, however, is not an unlimited resource. The fiscal rule on how returns may be phased in requires withdrawals from the fund to be distributed over a period of many years. While returns from the fund make it possible for the government to partially fund public expenditures without increasing taxes, the fund will likely not eliminate the need for gradually stricter prioritization in public spending.

↘ Figure 6 – Population projections 2020–2050 by age category (left) and labour force (20–64) relative to the population aged 65 and over (blue line, right).


Source: Statistics Norway (2020f) Population projections. Main alternative.

## Demographics and settlement

In the past few decades, the Norwegian population has increased significantly, as a result of high net immigration, relatively high birth rates, and a limited number of people in the age categories where mortality rates are high. Immigration has also led to the Norwegian population becoming more diverse in a variety of ways, such as cultural background, religion, experiences and preferences, to name a few. Aside from the fact that the number of old people is increasing, Norway's demographic development is much more uncertain now than it has previously been.

This uncertainty can largely be attributed to immigration, but there are also some uncertainties related to birth rates. Our population growth, however, is not evenly distributed geographically. The population increase will mostly come from the large cities in Eastern Norway. Inland municipalities, municipalities along the Swedish border and municipalities in northern Trøndelag and Northern Norway will most likely experience a decrease in population.

This is linked to job and education opportunities, cultural activities and lifestyle preferences within the population. A population with high levels of education will gravitate toward the services found in larger cities, and enterprises gravitate toward a broader labour market (Rattsø, 2014). The improved efficiency and reduced transport needs that follow from a higher population density make the cities more attractive (Economics Norway, 2016). Consumption of culture can increasingly take place "anywhere" and wherever people live. Digitalization and technology enable the audience to listen to music wherever they are, or watch a theatre performance live from their living rooms. Even so, a majority of cultural workers live in and around Oslo and other large cities.[16]

In recent decades, immigration has also led to much greater diversity in cultural backgrounds among the population, particularly in larger cities, where the immigrant population is especially high. Even though immigration now is significantly down, Statistics Norway project a continued net immigration surplus, which means that the number of people with immigrant backgrounds in the population will increase.

Based on Norwegian data, it is difficult to determine whether the availability of cultural services affects where people choose to live, but it would appear that places with an active cultural life appear to be more attractive to highly educated people (Vareide, 2018). Demographic trends also indicate that the rural population is getting older. In order to slow centralization, an active effort will have to be made by individual municipalities and our national government.[17]

16 See, for example, Malasevska and Ericsson (2019). Der ingen skulle tru ... – Regionaløkonomisk geografi av kreative og kulturelle næringer lokalisert utenfor Oslo, Norwegian Knowledge Centre for Cultural Industries report 01/2019

17 See, e.g., Official Norwegian Report 2020:12 Næringslivets betydning for levende og bærekraftige lokalsamfunn and Official Norwegian Report 2020:15 *Det handler om Norge — Utredning om konsekvenser av demografiutfordringer i distriktene.*

↘ Figure 7 – Regional population projections, main alternative 2020–2050




Source: Statistics Norway (2020f) Population projections

## Digitalization and technological developments

Many solutions to tomorrow's problems can likely be found in an ever more rapid technological development, where technological solutions are implemented in more and more areas. Norway's private and public sectors have traditionally been quick to implement new technology. A relatively high level of income incentivizes investments in technologies that reduce the need for labour. So far, new technology has led to reduced prices, increased household purchasing power and increased demand for goods and services — which in turn leads to increased demand for labour.
Technology eliminating the need for humans to perform routine tasks has been developed even further, and projections indicate that technology to an increasing degree can be used to perform even more cognitive tasks.

Technological development inevitably changes what society spends time on, and how we work. Over time, we have seen a dramatic decline in the number of persons employed in primary industries (fishing and agriculture), a somewhat less dramatic decline in secondary industries (industry, petroleum, energy supply and mining), and a dramatic increase in the service industries (including the public sector and administration). These changes can largely be explained by production technology, but also by globalization and income developments.

Digitalization, however, is more than "just" the introduction of new, digital products. Digitalization may also have fundamental and disruptive consequences for society. The smartphone is one example of an innovation that led to radical change.

Digitalization affects funding paths, income streams and copyright management. Digital development is entirely subject to international developments, and globalization means that we are more strongly affected by international trends than ever before. This represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the sector (Skarstein, 2016).

Large organizations may leverage economies of scale to their advantage in the digitalization process. For example, these types of organizations have the financial freedom to bear the cost of investing in the development of technology and of building an effective sales and marketing organization. When market participants then simultaneously collect valuable data with commercial potential, this may create a situation where the "winner takes all".

Take the music industry. Almost overnight, it went from making most of its income on concert tickets and physical products, such as CDs, books and merchandise, to becoming a more open industry, with a much more complex income stream. Licensing income from permitting works and recordings to be used in other products and services, and income from subscription services and streaming have generally become more important. Streaming differs significantly from more the more "traditional" sale of music, in that payment is now imposed per stream, as opposed to the sale of the right to listen to a song an unlimited number of times.
Among other things, this affects the sharing of income between different links in the value chain — it affects who profits from the music (Jesnes & Neergaard, 2019). Standing out in an overcrowded and chaotic market can sometimes also be

a major challenge for cultural producers (Norwegian Knowledge Centre for Cultural Industries, 2019). During the pandemic, we have seen a boom in live-streamed concerts and other exclusive, digital experiences, both free and paid. Whether this trend will continue when the pandemic is over, remains to be seen.

On the other hand, digitalization means that the entry costs for small players are lower. Small players may also benefit from greater flexibility in terms of technologies and platforms. Social media and various sharing platforms allow artists to personally disseminate and market their art, with a little help from the audience, who share and comment, thereby boosting visibility. This may render the traditional marketing phase superfluous. At the same time, the audience may influence cultural expressions by getting involved in the artistic process. Digitalization may therefore blur or erase traditional lines between artist and audience, marketing and consumption, and different artistic expressions (Hauge et al., 2019; Skarstein, 2016).

## Sociocultural factors

Sociocultural factors describe how populations, separately and together, perceive themselves. The values, norms, habits and conventions that shape the population also, in turn, shape society's sociocultural factors.

Sociocultural factors can be traced in behaviours. Family backgrounds, for example, explain much of the variation in the different educational paths and careers of individuals. This, in turn, affect recreational interests and use of culture (Raaum, 2003). The links between childhood and background and the values and choices an individual has and makes, are strong. Nevertheless, we have seen a gradual trend, where individuals increasingly prefer to choose their communities and educations, often completely detached from the values their childhood and family background would indicate that they have.

Generally speaking, researchers have argued that modern, Western individuals find themselves inhabiting a world that is increasingly coming to be shaped by the pervasive ideology of self-realization. Seeing the world as a marketplace is not limited to transactions involving material goods and services; it shapes every aspect of society and life, see Nafstad (2005).

This trend toward more individualistic choices is not uniform and does not affect every social group equally, but in a long-term perspective, the trend is pronounced. 70 years ago, people commonly used their parents' views as a starting point for decisions concerning both education and career opportunities as well as political affiliation. These views were, in turn, shaped by the dominant values in the local community and in the workplace. From the 1960s cultural revolution onward, our part of the world has strongly believed that modern people are free to define themselves, their roles and their communities.

Who is influencing whom is also much less straightforward nowadays.
Different family members may have different responses to media reports and current trends. Today, it is just as common for a corporate executive to take inspiration from their children's values as vice versa. Similarly, shared workplace values are much

more diverse. Even if those within the organization have similar views on what is important for the organization, their views on political and cultural issues outside the organization may vary considerably.

Naturally, this development is heavily affected by whether it is actually possible to pursue one's own value choices. This is more difficult in communities with strong social control than in communities where control and monitoring of an individual's behaviour is less strict. Similarly, in order to choose freely, education must be available to all at no cost or at affordable rates, and it must be possible to find a job.

In our particular context, it is especially important to note that when individualism is this solidly established, support for society's dominant values wanes and becomes more variable. Social mobility increases, but so does mobility of beliefs about what is best for society.

Greater freedom to make individual choices also increases the freedom to let financial self-interest guide one's values and behaviour. Some people also take into account the best interests of the group to which they belong, while others choose to emphasize their own self-interest in both a short and a long-term perspective.

Over time, a more individualized society has also led to altered patterns of consumption. Generally speaking, yesterday's consumer wanted to be normal, whereas today's consumer wants to stand out. It may very well be, however, that those who try their best to stand out, do so in the same ways, meaning that they perhaps are not quite as unique as they think they are. Their desire to be special nevertheless shapes their consumption behaviour.

Recreational consumption, in particular, has changed considerably in recent years. For many it has become essential to showcase their personalities through their recreational interests. Social media feeds into this and makes it easier to express one's individuality. As options and opportunities to do so are more diverse and accessible in cities, it is now widely argued that the possibility of pursuing individual preferences has been a major driving force for the attraction of cities in the last few decades.[18]

Individualization also influences the expectations people have of public services. All other things being equal, greater emphasis on individual preferences means that people care more about what is offered than about how it is offered.

This trend toward individualization is not without opposition. In recent years, increasing inequality in the rich part of the world has been subject of much debate. This debate has given rise to demands for more equal distribution of income and wealth, as well as for a wider range of universal schemes and programmes. Internationally, the Nordic countries are often held up as a shining example of striking the right balance between increased individualism and the development of universal, equalizing solutions. In particular, it is often pointed out that citizens of the Nordic countries generally have a high level of social trust, both in other people and in the

18 See, e.g., Richard Florida (2008): Who's Your City?, but also Edward Glaeser (2011): Triumph of the City. This topic was also addressed in Official Norwegian Report 2020:15 *Det handler om Norge — Utredning om konsekvenser av demografiutfordringer i distriktene.*

authorities, and that this level of trust is higher than in many other European countries (Kleven, 2016). With a high degree of trust, the need for strict regulations and control is less pressing, and it is easier to achieve change and innovation — finding good solutions with broad support in the population. So far, the Norwegian people's trust in the authorities does not seem to have been diminished as a result of the ongoing pandemic. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case.

Within the Nordic countries, however, there is increasing criticism that, here too, inequality is on the rise. In time, this may reduce support for collective solutions, as it will become more difficult to find solutions that accommodate the preferences of a majority of the population. Reduced social trust may lead to increased scepticism in the population when experts recommend social changes that challenge their way of life. As an example, there is a considerable faction of the Norwegian population who refuse to believe that climate change is caused by human activity. As a result, these people will likely also oppose any measures aimed at reducing emissions or raising taxes. Scepticism toward information provided by authorities and mainstream media also seems to rise as inequality increases and social trust deteriorates. We cannot rule out the possibility that inequality and reduced trust may also accelerate in Norwegian society once the pandemic is over, depending on how the "costs" of the pandemic are distributed during and after the pandemic. How these changes manifest in the cultural sector is uncertain.

## Environment and climate

It is widely accepted that our climate is changing, and that the changes are caused by human activity. Climate change is not some distant possibility; the climate is already changing, both in Norway and the rest of the world. Climate change may have serious implications for biodiversity and food production, and some areas of the world may become uninhabitable. A changing climate may lead to changing settlement and migration patterns both within and between countries, but we do not yet know whether this will lead to increased immigration to Norway (Tønnesen, 2014).

Norway has ratified the Paris Agreement, which requires that all countries present updated and ambitious climate plans every five years until the climate crisis has been resolved. This means significant cut-backs for Norway, whose consumption is one of the highest in the world. Norway's climate policy includes several specific goals. The targets for 2030 and 2050 have been formalized through a new Climate Change Act, which came into force on 01 January 2018. Under this Climate Change Act, Norway is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40 percent by 2030 compared with 1990. For 2050, the target is to achieve reductions of greenhouse gas emissions of the order of 80-95 percent from the level in the reference year 1990. This means Norway is committed to becoming a low-emission society by 2050. The transition to a low-emission society is expected to affect many different industries and areas of society.

Climate change, and measures implemented to reduce damage to the environment and climate, will have implications for the types of goods and services produced and provided, as well as for how these goods and services are produced and provided. Higher taxes on, for example, emissions, may have serious implications for many sectors. Increased emission costs will affect transportation costs, food production and the demand for power from renewable energy sources. The transition to a low-emission society poses a considerable challenge for Norway, but may also generate a wide range of new opportunities, such as in offshore wind power.

International cooperation on climate and environmental issues is also a central part of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. These Sustainable Development Goals are global calls to action to end poverty, fight inequality and stop climate change by 2030. They include 17 goals and 169 targets, establishing shared, global guidelines for countries, industries and communities. The Sustainable Development Goals will influence policies worldwide, within the EU and in Norway in years to come.

Sustainable development is built on three fundamental pillars — economic, social and environmental. These must be balanced in such a way that they meet targets related to economic growth, social development and environmental protection. An EU project on the role of culture in a sustainable future concludes that culture could serve as a fourth pillar (culture in sustainable development) and act as a cohesive and supportive force between the three other pillars (culture for sustainable development). Culture may also play a more fundamental role (culture as sustainable development), wherein culture is seen as a necessary foundation for and a necessary structure in achieving sustainable development targets.[19]

The role of culture in Norwegian sustainability efforts has been formalized to varying degrees. The museum and cultural heritage field, for example, focuses on mitigating loss of protected cultural heritage sites and objects as a result of climate change, among other things.

Internationally, considerable effort is going into protecting the intangible cultural heritage of indigenous peoples and minorities, which is under threat globally as a result of climate change, among other things. In Norway, Arts Council Norway is responsible for implementing UNESCO's Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage.

The cultural sector is often perceived as green or environmentally friendly. This may be because many cultural products by definition have a smaller climate footprint than consumable goods. This could indicate that demand for cultural experiences and services may increase in the future, provided that instruments and measures are implemented that promote more sustainable consumption habits (Economics Norway, 2020b). Maxwell and Miller (2019) challenge this assumption. Among other things, they point out the fact that the production of books and films may have considerable environmental consequences, and that digitalization, which is a central development trend in some segments of the cultural sector, is reliant on some resource use that is not unproblematic (extraction of materials, energy consumption, etc.).

Moreover, taking social development in a more sustainable direction could mean less tourism, and as tourist are central consumers of culture, demand for cultural production may decrease.

19 http://www.culturalsustainability.eu/outputs/conclusions.pdf

# Chapter 4 Selected driving forces in the scenariose

As described in Chapter 3, the cultural sector will be influenced by many different driving forces. In this chapter, we describe in more detail the selected driving forces played out in the four scenario narratives. These will act separately, but also in combination with each other.

Table 2 summarizes central driving forces, as described in the previous chapter, and as discussed in workshop 1. Some of these driving forces affect all aspects of Norwegian society, whereas others are more specific to the cultural sector.

↘ Table 2 – Driving forces and topics discussed in the workshop

| Societal area | Society in general | Specific to the cultural sector |
|---|---|---|
| Policy and regulations | • degree of globalization (e.g. free trade agreements)<br>• degree of polarization, pressure on freedom of expression and democracy, incl. scope of fake news<br>• Norway's relationship with rest of Europe and Nordic region | • direction of cultural policy<br>• autonomy of cultural sector |
| Economy | • public sector budgets lead to tougher prioritization<br>• economic inequality | • income development for cultural workers<br>• willingness to prioritize culture in public sector budgets<br>• population's preferences for spending time and money on culture |
| Demographics | • age distribution (and increased public expenditure)<br>• population composition (e.g. as result of immigration)<br>• settlement patterns (e.g. centralization) | • changes in preferences for different cultural expressions |
| Sociocultural factors | • support for collective solutions<br>• social trust<br>• sense of a shared culture, subcultures and segregation | • support for collective solutions |
| Technology | • automation of manual tasks<br>• use of and access to large quantities of data (power centred on small number of global organizations and the algorithms used)<br>• changes in distribution (as a result of reduced distribution and transaction costs)<br>• disruptive solutions that change "everything" | • new business models and payment solutions<br>• need for amendments of legislation and rights |
| Environment and climate | • adjustments to climate change<br>• increased emission costs, e.g. increased transport costs | • cost of organizing physical cultural events<br>• population's preferences for attending physical events |

Source: Economics Norway

During the workshop, participants were asked to identify a few select driving forces that (i) are particularly relevant for Norway's cultural sector, and (ii) have fundamentally uncertain outcomes, as these are the types of driving forces played out in the scenario narratives.

The workshop participants focused particular attention on the uncertainty surrounding the economy of the arts and culture sector, including the direction cultural policy will take. Digitalization, economic inequality, ageing, centralization and Norwegian society's ability to adapt to climate change were also discussed. In addition, participants focused on the cultural sector's ability to stay relevant for a majority of the population, and they emphasized the sector's contributions to and significance for democracy and freedom of expression. During these workshops, we tried to steer clear of discussing cultural policy itself, and instead focus on identifying the driving forces we believe could influence cultural policy. The reason for this approach is that we believe that cultural policy is not developed in a vacuum; both cultural policy and the cultural sector are influenced by societal developments in general.

After workshop 1, we analysed the notes from the plenary sessions and group discussion in order to formulate two driving forces that seem especially relevant for the cultural sector, and whose outcomes are uncertain.
In working to extract and define these two driving forces, we took care to select driving forces that were logically independent of each other, so that the combination of the two would yield four different future scenarios. If the two driving forces are interdependent, one would explain the other, and we are, in reality, left with only one underlying driving force.

Quite early in this process, it became clear that economic constraints, both in the population in general and in public sector budgets, are hugely significant for the cultural sector. It also became clear that Norway, as a society, faces considerable economic uncertainty in the years to come.

Many participants also pointed to technological development as a source of uncertainty. For example, they noted that digitalization affects the way in which cultural expressions are distributed, and how income is distributed within the sector. Ultimately, it affects who will be able to make a living from being an artist. The discussions illustrated that this uncertainty was not necessarily associated with ability of the sector and the general public to develop and adopt new digital solutions, but rather with how such changes would be met — by public authorities, by commercial entities and by the population in general. We interpreted this as the participants being uncertain of whether it is possible and desirable to develop collective solutions to technological, economic and regulatory challenges that may come along, or whether it will be up to each of us to face these challenges on an individual level. Furthermore, many participants expressed uncertainty about the degree to which collective goods, such as the production of cultural goods and the protection of cultural heritage, would be a priority in public sector budgets.

Participants also discussed increasing social and economic inequality in society in general and how this will affect both the Norwegian social model, which is characterized by a high level of social trust, and the support for collective solutions.

The result of this process was one economic and one sociocultural driving force, both defined at a general societal level and with uncertain outcomes in a 15-year time frame. These two driving forces are

- Norway's economic development
- the wider society's acceptance of collective solutions to challenges

Chapter 5 presents four narratives that play out the different combinations of these two selected driving forces "Norway's economic development" and "acceptance of collective solutions", see Figure 8. We have named these four narratives *Lykkeland*, *Stjernekamp*, *Himmelblå* and *Vestavind*. Below is a brief account of what the high and low outcomes of the two driving forces for change entail.

↘ Figure 1 – Scenario




Source: Economics Norway

## Norway's economic development

As discussed in Chapter 3, there is considerable uncertainty associated with Norway's economic development. "How will Norway earn money after oil?" has therefore long been a question politicians, researchers, corporate executives and others have grappled with.

One concern is whether there will be enough jobs for everyone. While concerns about the availability of jobs are real and relevant in some regions, it is more likely that, for the country as a whole, we will see a shortage of labour in many sectors due to limited growth in the labour force, combined with an increasing proportion of pensioners in the population. As we see it, a more relevant concern is therefore that few — if any — new industries will be able to provide incomes for employees, organizations and the government comparable to those provided by the petroleum sector for the past few decades. There is therefore a real concern that future income growth will be significantly lower than what Norway has enjoyed so far. If Norway sees a sufficiently large element of businesses and industries whose wage paying capacity is on a par with that seen in other European countries, our economic development will be more similar to those observed in these countries.

A further concern involves the funding of social welfare. Norway will see expenditures go up as the health and care sector expands and our population ages. Our expectation is that our government will have greater economic freedom than most other countries, thanks to the oil fund. Even so, increasing commitments and demands for public spending have given rise to concerns in many parts of society about what the government will be able to prioritize in the years to come.

In our scenarios, we play out two possible outcomes: In the scenarios *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, we assume that economic growth will be strong for the next 15 years, whereas in *Vestavind* and *Himmelblå*, economic growth will be relatively weak.

Like today, most sectors of society produce services that make life better, but labour and capital are not unlimited resources. Effective utilization of these resources is essential for our country's overall value creation and economic freedom.
In the scenarios where economic development is relatively strong, we assume that Norway has adapted to new, global market opportunities, and that Norwegian enterprises (private and public) have an advantage in international competition. Successful enterprises and industries are typically characterized by a significant element of technology and expertise, which, in turn, means that these organizations can tolerate relatively high salaries.

The logic applied in these scenarios indicates that in a future characterized by strong economic growth, a relatively high number of people work in enterprises and industries with a high wage paying capacity. We do not assume that Norway will find any new super-profitable industries, but rather that wage paying capacity will normalize. When wage paying capacity normalizes, industries with a high wage paying capacity will have to be relatively large in order to affect overall value creation.

We assume the population is able to recognize the link between work and income, and that people balance their time spent at work against their other interests. This includes cultural workers. Among both artists and other cultural workers, some groups emphasize other values than income. Generally speaking, however, in our scenarios with relatively strong economic growth the population pursues activities, enterprises and industries with a high wage paying capacity.

There are myriad different goods and types of cultural expressions and activities competing for the population's time and attention. At the same time, labour resources are in strong demand. In a future with relatively strong economic growth, we therefore assume that production, including in the cultural sector, will be realized through activities and organizations with a relatively high wage paying capacity.

While the development and implementation of new technology might make it possible for people to live anywhere, experience has shown that technology and knowledge-based businesses are generally located in or near cities. The logic of our scenarios with strong economic growth therefore indicates a stronger centralization trend, relatively speaking, than our scenarios where the economic growth is weaker.

What Norwegian society decides to do with its economic freedom is a matter for society to discuss and act on in the years after 2035. As the situation stands in 2035, however, we have not assumed any dramatic increases in the population's free time, nor any reforms that would reduce value creation.

In a future with less strong economic development, relatively speaking, we assume that more people are engaged in enterprises and industries with a somewhat lower wage paying capacity. In these scenarios, the composition of business and industry will of necessity be different. When income levels drop, this creates opportunities for businesses exposed to competition that could not survive with higher income levels. Services requiring little or no formal training will typically make up a larger share of the economy, and we imagine more geographically distributed industry and settlement patterns.

The scenarios with weaker economic growth would also lead to reduced tax revenues. This reinforces prioritization challenges in the public sector, even though some services will appear to be less costly because income levels are lower. For some parts of the population there is also a new consideration: As there is less to earn by working more, free time will be perceived as less expensive. The scenarios therefore apply a logic where the population generally has more free time in the scenarios with a relatively weak economic growth.

## Acceptance of collective solutions

This driving force reflects the tension between the community and the individual.

In an international context, Norway is a relatively homogeneous and egalitarian society, with a large public sector. After World War II, Norway was built on the principle of minimizing social, cultural and economic differences in the population. As an example, the Norwegian model of collective bargaining is central to the Norwegian wage-setting system, which helps explain the relatively moderate wage differences in Norway today. Tax policies also promote redistribution. Income taxation, large public transfers through the welfare system, and public funding for a wide range of services, such as kindergartens, schools and health services, contribute to minimizing differences between the rich and the poor and promote workforce participation among all genders. There has also been widespread acceptance of the distribution of revenues from petroleum activities across generations. This broad support for both redistribution and comprehensive collective solutions can be attributed to the population in general recognizing the benefit of these collective solutions and the equality they have fostered.
Two benefits in particular stand out for most people: increased income security and increased trust that social institutions benefit all people.

There are, however, several factors that could upset this acceptance of collective solutions. First, in order for people to recognize the benefit of collective solutions, it must be possible for them to compare their own social model to those of other countries, or possibly with their own country's historic development. The perception of these benefits may change over time, based both on how one's own country develops and on how other societies develop. Second, redistribution and collective solutions also come at a cost. Some will have to give up some of their resources to others or have their freedom of action restricted. When people's preferences become increasingly diverse, and more people find that the restrictions they are subject to are growing while benefits are shrinking, this could lead to less support for collective solutions.

A more heterogeneous population and greater emphasis on individual freedom and self-realization could mean individual goals could take precedence over the willingness to support collective solutions. Mobility, trust and inequality could lead to a greater emphasis on individual freedom and self-realization.

The driving force "acceptance of collective solutions" reflects how sociocultural changes on their own, or in combination with other driving forces, could influence the population's average preference for collective solutions. In a future where acceptance of collective solutions is high, we assume that there is broad support for various national collective solutions aimed at countering societal challenges, funding collective goods, minimizing social inequality and protecting the welfare state. In our scenarios with "high acceptance of collective solutions", we assume that the government allocates the same or more of its public expenditure to cultural purposes, compared to today. We also assume that there is broad support within the sector for collective formal or informal agreements.

Income protection for all is one type of collective solution. In *Himmelblå*, we have chosen to highlight "high acceptance of collective solutions" as the government introducing a universal basic income not linked to past or future income. We chose universal basic income as an income protection mechanism, because this form of income protection will likely be especially relevant for cultural workers and others in creative occupations. It is important to note that the introduction of universal basic income is an active choice within the scenario, and it is part of what distinguishes *Himmelblå* from *Lykkeland*. The introduction of universal basic income is not the only logical outcome of the combination "high acceptance of collective solutions" and "relatively weak economic growth".

In the opposite scenario, we assume that a future characterized by low acceptance of collective solutions implies that individuals to a greater degree are responsible for choosing their own path. They have to consider both the opportunities and the risks associated with their choices. The population tends to focus on their own personal situations and needs, and individual and market-based solutions play a bigger role in society in general and in the cultural sector in particular. In scenarios with "low acceptance of collective solutions", the government will assume less responsibility for income protection and funding of collective goods, like culture. Cultural workers and the public will both, to a larger degree, base their decisions on personal considerations. Nevertheless, we expect the population to seek out other people for a sense of community, but we expect that people will primarily be drawn to people and environments that are similar to themselves, or to people and environments they want to be associated with.

## Driving forces playing out in all scenarios

Beyond the two driving forces described above, several other driving forces will likely play out in all scenarios. We assume that the development and implementation of digital solutions will continue, but that the digitalization process will speed up in society in general and the cultural sector in particular, in the scenarios assuming strong economic growth. Continued digitalization primarily means increased demand for people with technical qualifications, more advanced products, reduced distribution costs and multiple sharing platforms, where artists can distribute and market their own art. Which segments of the cultural sector that will succeed is still uncertain, but we assume that employment rates in the distribution links of the value chain will decrease somewhat in all scenarios.

We furthermore assume that the climate will continue to change, making Norway warmer, wetter and wilder in the entire period leading up to 2035. The climate changes themselves entail increased transport costs and a slight rise in demand for technicians and engineers in the fields of construction, environmental protection and technology. Climate change is a fixed factor in all scenarios. This entails that adaptations in consumption or the development of new technology in the next 15–20 years will have limited impact on the climate. The effects may, of course, be significant over time, particularly if populations in other countries also adjust their preferences, but these effects do not play out in the different scenarios, because other driving forces are considered more relevant and uncertain in the years to come.

Furthermore, we have assumed that the Norwegian population will increase in accordance with Statistics Norway's main projection, from 5.4 million in 2020 to 5.7 million in 2035. The ageing of the population will continue, which means we will see an increased demand for labour in the health and care sector. Immigration will also increase, but this factor strongly correlates to circumstances outside Norway. Naturally, there is considerable uncertainty associated with the number of refugees as a result of war, climate change and other humanitarian disasters, as well as national and international asylum policies. Labour migration will be more closely correlated to how the Norwegian economy develops in relation to developments in countries from which migrant workers to Norway have historically come. We have opted to assume a development in population size equivalent to Statistics Norway's main alternative in all scenarios, because other uncertainties besides population growth are considered more relevant and uncertain in the years to come.

# Chapter 5
# Scenario narratives

This chapter presents four scenario narratives, intended to illustrate the Norwegian cultural sector in 2035. The cultural sector has its own dynamic, but it will nevertheless be affected by societal driving forces affecting Norwegian society in general. The narratives begin with a brief description of Norwegian society and the cultural sector in 2035, before we account for trends and events that have affected development in the years leading up to 2035.

It is important to note that the purpose of these scenario narratives is not to represent an ideal or desired outcome, but rather to describe different futures that relate to each other in interesting ways. While the scenarios are interesting, this does not necessarily mean they are the most likely outcomes of the various driving forces that shape our society. They do, however, highlight potential outcomes of the driving forces we have selected.

The scenario narratives do not capture every aspect of the sector in the given scenario, but instead emphasizes certain characteristics to illustrate differences between the scenarios. In addition, the scenarios also illustrate how none of them are intended to represent a dream scenario or a doomsday scenario. All of the futures described include some aspects considered favourable and other aspects that are less so. This highlights driving forces readers ought to keep in mind when developing policies or strategies.

The scenarios are intended as a prelude to further discussion on how the Norwegian cultural sector could develop, particularly in light of economic developments and support for collective solutions, which these scenarios are based on, but also in response to other driving forces and uncertainties that may affect the sector in the years to come.


Leselyst

## Lykkeland

*Lykkeland* is the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth and high support for collective solutions. The country has a high wage paying capacity, and our economic growth is characterized by high levels of activity in technological and knowledge-based enterprises and industries. Carbon capture and storage, underwater technology, sensor technology and welfare technology are examples of areas where Norway is a world-leader. Norway has a highly educated population and a large, but digitalized and centralized public sector. Wealthy tourists find Norway attractive as a holiday destination, but internationally, the country has a reputation as being expensive to visit.

In *Lykkeland*, the cultural sector is shaped by the country's active and curious cultural audience. People are drawn to culture for inspiration, learning and recreation, and sharing experiences with friends and family is a priority for many. The majority of people believe it is important to have a diverse and accessible variety of cultural activities— even if they don't always have the time to take advantage of them.

Most people live in or near the country's largest cities, and vibrant cultural scenes are most commonly found here and at major tourism destinations. Bodø is one of the cities that have developed a strong cultural reputation both in Norway and abroad. The effects of the city's status as a European Capital of Culture gave a boost, from which the regional cultural sector is currently reaping the benefits. The city's urban and industrial development has long been impressive, and it is currently the hub of almost everything that happens in Nordland. The availability of physical cultural activities and meeting places is much more limited in more sparsely populated areas.

↘ Press release, 01 April 2035

### Leselyst an audience favourite

*The Norwegian people have selected a public platform as an audience favourite for the first time. "We are proud that our target audience appreciate the hard work we all have put into this," says the Minister of Culture.*

With a score of 88 points, Leselyst won first place in the Norwegian Customer Satisfaction Barometer above SmartBil (85), Finn (83 and Vinmonopolet (82). This is the first time in NCSB history that a cultural entity has won first place.

Leselyst earns top scores in categories "clear language", "user-friendliness" and "price" — clear indication that Leselyst has managed to inspire the population.
The survey measures customer satisfaction and loyalty on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is the lowest score and 100 is the best.

Norwegian School of Economics

*Lykkeland* is the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth and high support for collective solutions. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

***Cultural policy*** has a high priority and fixed budget allocations of 1.5 percent of public expenditures, in accordance with the Long-Term Plan for the Cultural Sector. The goal of the cultural policy is to safeguard the public's access to all forms of culture, but also to ensure that professional cultural workers earn an income on par with the rest of society, and to provide prioritized institutions and programmes with stable funding.

In *Lykkeland*, public cultural management is strong, and budgets are more generous than ever before. At the same time, central government grants come with clear expectations of accessibility, representation and relevance for the audience and society in general. Considerations of the creative abilities of artists and individuals are also emphasized, but usually not beyond lip service.

In *Lykkeland*, the government and the cultural sector actively work together to find solutions that are both competitive and mindful of the objectives framed out in cultural policy. One example is the hugely successful *Leselyst*, which translates to *Joy of Reading*, is a digital, joint Nordic platform, where all new literature is recorded and made available as audio books. User fees are low, and the service helps people find literature they like with the help of algorithms.

Payments are covered by the government and calculated on the basis of listener numbers. Authors are happy, too, because the payment per playback is higher than what the international platforms are offering. The service is also linked to libraries and digital learning tools used in schools and the health and care sector.

***Cultural institutions*** in and near large cities are active and vibrant and serve as important meeting places for ordinary people. Music and stage institutions under Statens kulturbygg, a government-owned manager and developer of cultural buildings and properties, for example, provide a wide range of cultural events including government-funded ensembles, but also independent artists and ensembles with government authorization. Norwegian cultural institutions are known for using digital technology in ticket systems, as well as in the production and presentation of cultural expressions, and figures for digital and physical performances in Norway and abroad are generally high. Norway is also widely acknowledged as a world leader in protecting our shared cultural heritage, even though many smaller museums and local cultural centres have been closed after years of dwindling patronage and recruitment problems. There are many examples of primary schools, libraries and cultural centres that have been converted to smart homes for seniors.

Norway has a high number of ***cultural workers***. Artists have a sense of being an active and appreciated part of Norwegian society. Payment and employment conditions for artists and other professional cultural workers are generally good, especially for those employed by or affiliated with government-funded cultural institutions. Norway is known for a new generation of artists with strong ICT skills, who are developing artistic expressions in collaboration with the audience in real time or based on Norwegian cultural heritage. As an example, a Tromsø couple who are both visual artists, have earned international acclaim for their modern interpretations of Sami traditions.

While there has been no formalized objective to centralize cultural policy or cultural production, *Lykkeland* is characterized by a general acknowledgement that artistic and cultural activities are an urban phenomenon. After a period of intense debate concerning the decline of public libraries, cultural centres and other services in rural areas, this is now less prominent in the public discourse in 2035. Artists, too, want to live "where things happen", and opportunities for rewarding and income-generating work are most plentiful in the city. "Nursing Home Artists" and other initiatives financed as part of the Cultural Walking Stick programme have become a welcome addition for elderly people in a life otherwise characterized by sensors and screens. This is particularly true for elderly people outside the big cities. In reality, however, few elderly people truly benefit from this initiative. In rural districts, Nursing Home Artists and other initiatives are largely recreational or driven by passionate individuals.

***Cultural discourse*** is otherwise largely characterized by individual artists questioning the dominant role of the government and the autonomy and creative power of art. There is also some grumbling within the sector, because expensive initiatives like *Leselyst* have led to some parts of the cultural sector seemingly having been deprioritized compared to others.

## The road ahead to 2035

In the period 2020–2035, Norwegian society was characterized by gradual and successful transition. While the pandemic was a challenging time, it also brought the nation together, including on the issue of how Norway should address the major transitional challenges that lay ahead. As the 2020s progressed, a broad consensus developed that the main solution lay in developing and implementing new technology. Investments in competence, research and labour-saving technology became a priority.

Norway was seen as an important "test market" for new solutions, for both Norwegian and foreign technology companies alike. The government's active investments in technology-based growth was one reason, but equally important was the population's considerable willingness to implement new solutions. Digitalization was made a priority in the public sector, both to develop the Norwegian technology industry and to reduce employment growth in the public sector. Online education, sensor technology, national medical records systems and remote treatment are examples of measures prioritized in the first half of the 2020s.

As a result, many unskilled jobs were lost, especially in rural districts. It was important to distribute the "benefits" of rationalization. Consequently, the Norwegian model of coordinated wage-setting was reinforced, both in legislation and in public procurements, and new requirements were implemented where unemployed people had to complete competence-building programmes.

Technology-based industries grew considerably in the 2020s. Experts generally lived in and near large cities, which is where most important decisions were made, not least in connection with large, public technology initiatives. This industrial expansion led to increased activity in private and public services, which, in turn, reinforced the attraction of cities.

Feeble attempts at countering rural depopulation were insufficient to counteract growth in the big cities, which led to a new debate on public management. In 2028, the number of municipalities was reduced to 150. Counties were dissolved and their responsibilities transferred to national authorities.

The ***cultural sector*** was hit hard by the pandemic in 2020, and there was broad support for the crisis packages given to the sector. The crisis highlighted how important a vibrant cultural scene is in people's lives. While activities resumed as restrictions lifted, challenges were lining up for the sector. Cultural news regularly reported on a strong increase in services provided by international organizations and low incomes for cultural workers and institutions in Norway. Some reports argued that even very successful artists were not able to make a living on the income provided. At the same time, many cultural institutions struggled with increasing pension, security, ICT and maintenance costs. Many were deeply concerned that the Norwegian cultural sector would fall into a long-term crisis and lose its audience to international providers of culture.

As the 2020s progressed, several measures were implemented both within the sector itself and by the government, to address these challenges. In 2023, the government introduced its Long-Term Plan for the Cultural Sector. One key goal in this plan was to earmark 1.5 percent of public expenditure to cultural purposes by 2030. This goal was ambitious, both in a Norwegian and an international context, and the intention was to ensure protection and production of collective cultural goods demanded by the audience and society in general, a stable framework for institutional operation and a decent income for cultural workers. One of the first major outcomes of this new strategy was the formation of Statens kulturbygg. Statens Kulturbygg was put in charge of the operation (ICT, security, maintenance, etc.) of public cultural structures and buildings deemed to have national value. The objective was to create synergies in these areas and to ensure that a larger share of cultural allocations would go to the production of art and cultural expressions. "It is now time to ensure that investments made with public funds in the 2000s are managed in line with the public's wishes. Only in this way can we continue this strong cultural initiative in the years to come," the Minister of Culture said at the launch.

Separating infrastructure from production also meant that government-approved artists, groups and ensembles could use the various stages and venues on equal terms. These changes were met with considerable scepticism by many operators in the cultural sector, who feared competition both from within the sector and from international cultural workers. Audiences did not find any problems with the changes — on the contrary. Arts Council Norway was tasked with establishing a national approval scheme for artists, ensembles and others hoping to gain access to Statens Kulturbygg's institutions. The goal was for the scheme to safeguard both diversity and representation, while also facilitating the efficient use of the infrastructure and some level of competition. Over time, the outcome of the scheme was that the artists and ensembles the audiences were most willing to pay to see, were in the best position to book attractive venues at the best times.

The government's active role also manifested in other areas. For example, Statens Kulturbygg and the Norwegian University of Science and Technology entered into a technological collaboration for the remainder of the 2020s. This collaboration led to the development of advanced technology for digital performances, ticket sales, simultaneous translation and other facilities that made culture produced in Norway more accessible.

A further example is Leselyst, which was introduced in 2028 after a tough round of negotiations. The initiative was met with scepticism by publishers, but at the same time, they also feared competition from international providers and unhappy authors. The platform had the active support of the Nordic Council of Ministers, but this was an initiative led by and paid for by the Norwegian government. Operation and further development of the platform was funded by subscriber payments and allocations in the national budgets of the countries in the Nordic region. The cost of developing the solution, payments to publishers and recurring payment would turn out to be higher than expected. Throughout the 2020s, the growth in government expenditures on culture exceeded that of municipal expenditures on culture.


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BROUGHT TO YOU BY LOW
LOW
NEW WORKS!
DANCE
STAR!
THE SINGING POET
LOW for dummies
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## Stjernekamp

*Stjernekamp* is the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth, but with low support for collective solutions. Activity is high in technology and commodity-based enterprises and industries with a high wage paying capacity. Automated commodity-based industrial production, land-based seafood production, offshore wind energy and weapons technology are fields in which Norway is competitive in an international context. In *Stjernekamp*, Norway is the country where everyone is the architect of their own fortune, with industry-friendly policies and low taxes.

The cultural sector is characterized by the ***cultural audience*** preferring popular culture, with most of the consumption of culture taking place on international platforms. The overall share of household income spent on culture is lower than it has been for many years. Cultural service offerings are dominated by artists, activities and institutions that cater to audience preferences.

Commercial cultural services are offered on a large scale, from all corners of the world. Nobody thinks twice about the Munch Museum being owned by a Chinese cultural corporation.

Young people navigate seamlessly through a technological and digital universe, and lines between recreational activities are blurry. One example is the popular multi-platform game LOW. This is a networking and entertainment arena that is also used to present and disseminate digital art, created by the users themselves. The service has manifested itself as one of the most important marketplaces, and enterprises that are not present on the platform, lose market shares to those who are.

↘ Invitation to the Prime Minister

**The Academy of Dance and Performing Arts hereby invites you to this year's graduation performance**

We have the pleasure of inviting you to our annual graduation performance, starring the outstanding master's degree candidate Pedram Esfahani. This performance is funded by the Chinese cultural group Four Stars.

Esfahani, currently completing a master's degree in dance and entrepreneurship at the Baker Academy of Dance and Performing Arts is already an internationally accomplished star, with support from Talent Norge and the Baker Foundation. The New York resident has performed on great stages all around the world, and this year, we are lucky to have him perform here in Oslo.

Our main sponsor Four Stars plans to make the performance available on a wide range of platforms.

*Stjernekamp* – the story of a Norway with relatively strong economic growth, but with a low degree of support for collective solutions. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

The cultural audience with the deepest pockets is limited in scope, but is not afraid to spend money on cultural expressions reinforcing their identity and position in society. Stories of what they have seen and which events they have attended, serve as status markers within their social circle. The people in this group are attracted to technically outstanding artistic expressions and artists. They are well informed about internationally renowned institutions and artists, but are often too busy to seek out cultural events in their own city. Condensed performances with full service, where audience members can get a cultural experience while mingling with friends and business associates have become a huge success.

Visitors are the biggest source of income for the country's largest stages. The use of ear plugs and machine learning for simultaneous translation, means that it does not matter if the audience or the artists on stage do not speak Norwegian.

Politicians are proud when Norwegian artists earn international acclaim. In other respects, ***cultural policy*** is not at the forefront of the social discourse. We have had a decade of limited growth in public allocations for culture, so public spending tends to prioritize basic funding for public institutions deemed to have national value, protection of cultural heritage, KunstFUNN (a tax incentive scheme for art), and talent schemes. KunstFUNN is believed to be the motivation behind the industrial group Baker's decision to promote young talent.

***Cultural institutions*** fight for the public's attention. Most institutions offer tours and performances using virtual technology, but the institutions' revenues also depend on audiences attending performances, shows and events in person. There is considerable variation in terms of which audiences they target and how the institutions approach commercial opportunities, such as widespread sale of gifts or strategic partnerships with travel operators, media companies and others.

Some museums remain very attractive to audiences and have never before had visitor numbers this high, despite gradual increases in ticket prices. In reality, however, many regional museums, libraries and cultural centres may soon flicker out of existence. For some time now, they have been caught in a self-reinforcing negative spiral of low visitor numbers and insufficient resources to improve their services physically or virtually. Several museum arenas have been spun off from the major museums and are now run by volunteers. In Western Norway, a famous cluster farm was sold and converted to a historic hotel when its protected status was lifted. In the hotel's reception area, a famous British artist has designed a digital animation on life in the cluster farm in the 1600s.

After many years of decline, the number of professional CULTURAL workers in Norway is much lower than it was in 2020. Norway has several artists and enterprises that are internationally renowned in different genres. Norway also has some artists who do well financially. One example is the Norwegian musicians who secured their own and their children's financial future after selling their rights to the international copyright company RightMusic.

One interesting feature of the Norwegian cultural scene is that many of our most renowned artists have international backgrounds. Norwegian art sociologist Wang Bo is a favoured interview subject when it comes to explaining why this is. He emphasizes the willingness of some families to develop their children's full potential in specific art forms. In order to do that, you have to start early and maintain a life-long perspective. As an example, he cites the famous dancer Pedram Esfahani. He initially trained with his father in Trondheim, before they moved to Oslo as soon as Pedram was old enough to attend the Baker Academy of Dance and Dramatic Arts.

All in all, however, Norway does not have very many professional cultural workers, and the number of people working with specialized distribution of art and culture is especially low. International providers often own the platforms where art is disseminated, and they have considerable power. Norwegian technology companies focus on other sectors. AmaSpeed has cornered the market on streaming and the sale of paper books. They use drones to deliver books and whatever else you might want within two hours. Paper books are also sold in coffee bars, but more to set a mood than out of any real monetary interest.

After a period of heavy debate on the difference between art and commercial culture and how difficult it is to make a living as an artist, these topics are no longer as prominent in the public discourse in 2035. Artists and other cultural workers who cannot sustain themselves on the income provided have already found alternative careers, and applications to arts education dwindle year by year. In *Stjernekamp*, the CULTURAL DISCOURSE is characterized by some critics claiming that high ticket prices form a barrier that prevents certain groups from taking part, and by arguments that slow art has become a purely academic exercise. These debates, however, rarely come up in the public discourse.

### The road ahead to 2035

For two decades, Norwegian society has been characterized by rapid changes in both industry and social life. Two years of crisis packages introduced to deal with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic led to increased debate focused on the need for transitional action in Norwegian industries. Several researchers argued that the crisis packages propped up companies that were no longer competitive, thus impeding the rate of transition. These concerns were reinforced by increasing uncertainty concerning whether Norwegian industry would be able to keep up in the technology race and problems with capital flight to other countries.

Both in industry and in the general population, there was considerable interest in investing in technology and technology-oriented expertise, but industry organizations demanded more investment incentives and lower taxes. More and more areas experienced a lack of qualified labour, something that reinforced the belief that the public sector had to reduce its demand for labour. The government came through on both fronts, and the media regularly reported on closed schools, real estate billionaires and rich wind barons. Researchers pointed to the consequences of increasing inequality, but ultimately, voters focused on their own interests. It became increasingly important to justify public spending by claims of promoting transition and value creation. Support for collective solutions gradually declined in several areas of society.

The ***cultural sector*** was not immune to expectations of increased value creation, and the sector took several steps in the 2020s to increase private of culture. The 2023 white paper on cultural policy emphasized the role of culture in facilitating creativity, growth and adaptability (CGA). CGA became a key acronym in the 2020s, as well as the main theme for Arts Council Norway's annual conference in 2024: "Culture in the Digital Age". In the late 2020s, this work culminated in the development of a wide range of small, niche-based global organizations providing personalized services with a focus on creativity, aesthetics and design. Several internationally prominent gaming companies, for example, originated in the technological communities in Trondheim and Gjøvik. The games created by the Norwegian company IcePlay are widely regarded as works of art.

In 2028, KunstFUNN was introduced as an incentive to increase private investments in art, and later that year, industrial group Baker introduced plans to establish a scholarship programme for young talents and donate funds to the Academy of Dance and Dramatic Art. Two years later, the industrial group got a representative on the Academy's board of directors and a year after that, "Baker" was incorporated in the Academy's name.

Many young people dream of becoming artists, but most fine art graduates put their dreams of becoming artists aside when adult responsibilities come knocking. Some artists receive support from their parents, private sponsors or scholarships from private foundations, but in general, very few people are able to make a living as professional artists. “Up, out or sideways” is an expression often used to describe the careers of many artists, and the last part is often applied to the many artists who put their creativity to use in much better paid positions in the public and private sectors. Many artists work in the gaming and media industries, in industrial design or in education.

Recruitment to the sector gradually declined from 2025 onwards. Politicians paid lip service to safeguarding performer diversity and keeping culture accessible to the masses, but compared to previous times, developments indicated that the market handled all commercially viable culture and that the role of the government was limited to protecting cultural heritage and developing artists with international potential. This argument found resonance in claims that a small country like Norway cannot be great at everything.


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ART
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# Vestavind

*Vestavind* is the story of a Norway characterized by many years of weak economic growth, and where acceptance of collective solutions is low. Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth

*Vestavind* is the story of a Norway with relatively weak economic growth and with a low degree of support for collective solutions. Aquaculture, pharmaceuticals and tourism are examples of industries that do well. Norway also has certain other companies with global competitive advantages, but in general, Norway has fewer world-leading companies than our neighbours. In all sectors, we find that our greatest talents tend to get snapped up by international companies in other countries. Many groups of the population have more in common with like-minded groups in other countries than with the rest of the Norwegian population. A majority of the population lives in cities, but aquaculture, engineering industry activities and tourism have considerable ripple effects and create jobs in rural areas.

In 2035, it is not really possible to define a single Norwegian ***cultural audience***. Different groups have different motivations for their consumption of culture depending on their interests, values, financial circumstances and free time. For many, art is a source of identity and community, but the consumption of culture can also be used as a signal for who one does not want to be associated with. Many people find community in culture, and art is a key outlet for social criticism.

Cultural consumption in the form of personal attendance at paid cultural events, however, is generally low, after years of decline. Many people feel that attending cultural events is a luxury they can neither afford nor have time for. Many also do not find cultural expressions produced in Norway to be particularly relevant. A great deal of cultural consumption takes place in the home. People with limited means prefer to attend sporting or cultural events that are either affordable or based on volunteerism. Nevertheless, in some segments of the population cultural consumption is high. This is particularly true for those with a high income, who pay for their own cultural consumption.

***Cultural policy*** is not at the forefront of the political discourse. Public spending on culture is limited. Institutions that do receive support are associated with cultural heritage protection, as well as some selected art and cultural institutions.

***Cultural institutions*** are creative in their pursuit of income and audiences, and many cultural institutions are filled with other content than paid cultural services. Many wealthy individuals support cultural institutions with annual donations. The motivation behind these donations is often to reduce barriers to rewarding experiences, but this type of support also generates positive public attention for the benefactor. In support of public art museums, some private art collectors show considerable interest in lending their collections out. There are notable exceptions, however. One of the country's richest salmon billionaires has spent many years building a unique collection of Norwegian and international contemporary art, and once a year, he makes it available to the public.

In the absence of an active cultural policy, cultural institutions see it as their responsibility to ensure a minimum of diversity and cultural services for those who would not otherwise seek out paid events. Since the gradual discontinuation of programmes like The Cultural Schoolbag, several institutions have started inviting classes to attend dress rehearsals. "We have a social responsibility to present culture, especially to groups of people we know do not take advantage of our services," said the director for the network of institutions. Many teachers applaud the initiative but are also critical of the fact that only a limited number of children will be able to benefit from it.

In *Vestavind* the funding of regional and local cultural events is subject to fierce political debate. Public spending in the cultural sector varies considerably from region to region. As an example, the degree to which libraries prioritize purchasing new books varies considerably. Some municipalities prioritize care activities and entrepreneurship academies. Libraries still serve as meeting places for those with an interest in literature, but a pressing need to secure income means many look more like coffee shops than libraries.

***Cultural workers*** have different backgrounds and different preferences, and are an extremely heterogeneous and divided group. Creativity is abundant, but there are considerable differences in the income of cultural workers and cultural institutions.

Some cultural workers and organizations gain more financial freedom by forming partnerships with private investors. These investors like to think they are like the old patrons of the arts, but they also have strong commercial motivations.

Saturday opinion piece, 10 March 2035

**National soul sold for quick cash writes Bjarne Berg, Professor of Dramatic Arts**

*A building is not just a building. The sale of the National Theatre ten years ago left a wound on our national soul that will never heal and marked the beginning of the social corruption of our time.*

The National Theatre was a core symbol of our culture, the beating heart of society and our shared identity. Today, it has been exactly five years since this national treasure was sold. At the time, it came as a shock to us all. It should have been a wake-up call. Now we can see that it marked the beginning of the end for the community that was the hallmark of our nation-building and Norwegian cultural life. Some small comfort can be taken from the fact that art still fills these halls, but we lost so much along the way. The building is no longer filled with emotions, sensory impressions, reflections of ourselves and our past. It is no longer the people's house.

Most artists and cultural workers are self-employed, and artists find their audience or supporters among like-minded individuals in physical or digital spaces. While many are still able to carve out a living as professional cultural workers, much of the work is performed on a voluntary basis by amateurs. The artist economy is, for most people, a patchwork economy. Many artists combine artistic work with part-time positions in cultural organizations or other sectors.

After many years of debate on whether the free and inaccessible niche arts are at risk when public sector budgets are slashed, this topic is no longer able to capture the public's attention. In *Vestavind*, the cultural discourse is dominated by several cultural leaders who argue that our country has become culturally impoverished. Culture researchers are concerned about the consequences of a majority of cultural consumption taking place in a private sphere, as well as about the prominence of private investors. Politicians and the upper classes are often the subject of satirical art. The accusations are serious, but few people get involved. The cultural sphere generally does not get much attention in the public realm.

## The road ahead to 2035

In this scenario, *Norwegian society* was never really able to adapt to the post-pandemic transition, drop in oil prices and the green shift of the 2020s. Oil prices stabilized at a low level, and demand for Norwegian industrial products fell. Both resulted in increased unemployment rates.

The situation was far more stable for those employed in the public sector, and the public sector became an attractive employer for many. The ageing population and employment stability of the public sector made it difficult for politicians seeking re-election to cut public spending. The population also opposed proposals for longer workdays and higher retirement ages to "save" the community and our welfare benefits.

As a result, withdrawals from the oil fund increased year by year. The great student revolt of 2025 reflected the fears of young people that pensions and other public spending would drain the fund in the course of just a few years. The hunger-striking students put tape across their lips that read "Our future".

In order to limit public spending, a broad coalition agreed that the public sector had to rationalize their own services. Public expenditure deemed inessential in maintaining core welfare services were locked at 2025 level, without compensation for changes in income or prices.

Employer's contributions were reduced twice after 2025, but only at the highest level. Indirect subsidies going to industry and businesses in rural areas were also reduced. Rural municipalities with internationally competitive industries did well. The same applied to destinations popular with foreign tourists, who found Norway to be an affordable and beautiful country. In much of the country, however, the industrial base was weak.

In the late 2020s, tensions flared between young and old, city and country. Norway still did relatively well on international rankings of the world's best countries to live in, but these scores did not reflect the large numbers of people who felt abandoned by society at large. Trust in the authorities and the community eroded in parts of the population. The dividing lines did not only separate right from left politically, but followed many different, increasingly undefined axes. People found something or someone to identify with, often on social media or other digital platforms. These various "digital groupings" were often international. There was concern in some quarters that this was a dangerous development — so many people finding their own communities of like-minded people, and the large, shared debates where people with opposing views came together have all but disappeared.

The overall perception that everyone must find their own path also characterized the ***cultural sector***. In the cultural field too, public spending was capped at the 2025 level. Several of the country's largest theatres were among those who had their state subsidies slashed. "Why should we as a community subsidize rich pensioners who like opera and theatre," asked the leader of the country's largest youth party in digital debate forums.

The 2020s also saw a boom in private donations and foundations. Their role in the funding of arts and culture soon became essential. But these foundations were not sufficient in number or large enough to compensate for cuts in public spending. The funding was also unpredictable. Many institutions had to raise prices or cut their offerings.

In 2030, the National Theatre was sold to one of the world's largest private auction houses for antiques, contemporary art and securities. The government justified the sale by arguing that it could no longer cover the immense restoration costs, and when the offer came in, it resolved some difficult budgeting problems. The politicians boasted that the building would still house culture and promised that the proceeds of the sale would be earmarked for general cultural purposes. In practice, however, this promise was difficult to keep.


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# Himmelblå

*Himmelblå* is the story of a Norway with relatively weak economic growth, but with strong support for collective solutions. In *Himmelblå*, society is characterized by the population's pursuit of what many call "the good life". Personal development, care for one's local community and family life rank high on most people's list of priorities. The government has assumed a special responsibility for basic protections and national infrastructure. Universal basic income plays an important role in this context. The basic income is not high but means that every individual is guaranteed a minimum income and has considerable freedom to spend their time in accordance with their wishes. Decentralization of power and funds to regions and municipalities aims to ensure that local communities are able to make priorities in accordance with their needs.

The ***cultural audience*** is relatively large — many are willing to spend both time and money on culture, even though most people are very careful about how they spend their money. Very few people can afford to prioritize the most expensive cultural activities. For many, expressing themselves through art and culture is more important than being in the audience. Cultural events are an important aspect of a shared identity and are what keep many local communities together.

Cultural offerings are diverse, popular and locally-oriented. Cultural tourism is also an important industry in *Himmelblå*. Many visitors see Norway as an exotic destination, and it is not as expensive for foreigners as it once was. Life is lived at a considerably slower pace here, compared to what is common in many other European countries.

The quest for a good, free and creative life also shapes ***cultural policy***. This policy largely consists of safeguarding infrastructure in the form of institutions and arenas for the production and dissemination of art and culture. The government funds all national institutions, including the Norwegian broadcasting company NRK, which plays an important role.

The country's 13 regions are responsible for museum management, regional theatres, protection of cultural heritage and other grants to local and regional arenas. With the introduction of a universal basic income, public funding of cultural production has been reduced to a minimum. Development projects, expensive productions or acquisitions of costly works are not common, because neither the public nor the public sector is willing to pay for it

News alert!

**New industrial success story for artists' region Vestfold and Telemark**

*Artists in the Industry community, famous for their spectacular exhibitions and presentations in old industrial buildings in Vestfold and Telemark, garnered international fame overnight when they partnered with The Met in New York.*

"This recognizes the tireless efforts of the region's museum network and the entire population of Vestfold and Telemark, who have worked so hard for many years.
From tradespersons who have volunteered to restore old buildings, to artists who involve us and bring us together," says Kamala Morris, sculptor and spokesperson for Industry. She would like to thank all those who contributed.

She says the whole adventure started when she first visited the Norwegian Industrial Workers Museum at Vemork in Rjukan. "It woke a great curiosity in me. I continued to explore and eventually became good friends with the director of the regional museum network. Eventually, we founded Industry and since then have worked hard to promote local production of high-quality art, while also supporting our museums and our amazing industrial and cultural heritage," says Morris.

The combination turned out to be a success — and soon we will be able to see art from Industry at The Met in New York, while pieces from The Met's own collection will be on display at the Norwegian Industrial Workers Museum.

*Himmelblå* - is the story of a Norway where economic growth has been and remains weak, whereas acceptance of collective solutions is high. *Illustration: Sunniva Sunde Krogseth*

In all regions, cultural centres, libraries and museums are arenas where various kinds of cultural activities take place. There are considerable regional differences, however. In some regions, these institutions are central arenas for exhibitions and co-creation, whereas in other regions, the cultural scene plays a much more limited role. Several cities are often referred to as "cultural cities". Fredrikstad, for example, is known as Writer City, where young, aspiring writers draw inspiration from conversations with more experienced authors and the many editors in the publishing network Frekk. The Fredrikstad House of Literature is also where the Bokpodden literary podcast is recorded. Henningsvær has a growing reputation as a vibrant cultural city for handicraft and visual art, including blown glass art "on the pier" and the many galleries as central attractions that attract cultural tourists year-round.

***Cultural workers*** live and work all over the country, especially in the above-mentioned"cultural cities". Other regions and cities have other specialities. In all areas of cultural life there is a high level of activity, among both amateurs and professionals. Universal basic income has led to many people choosing to make a living as cultural workers of various kinds. Artists and other cultural workers not employed by government institutions often take project-based work, where some work is paid and some work is voluntary. As an example, many actors work in local historical plays and children's theatre groups without receiving any payment, while also working on a film production or a play with their own acting group. The cultural sector is primarily characterized by the many amateur artists whose main source of income is universal basic income. Their number equals that of professional cultural workers and account for just under ten percent of all recipients of universal basic income.

Norway does have some artists who have found international success. Several of these live abroad and earn more from international markets than from Norway. However, Norway generally does not have a reputation as a nation that fosters artists with international potential.

After a long period of positive reports on "everything that is happening" as a result of the introduction of universal basic income, the cultural discourse is now dominated by people who argue that we need a more aggressive cultural policy and strategic initiatives. Cultural workers in urban areas in particular are advocating for new initiatives in cultural policy. Some critics question the quality of Norwegian art and cultural production. Most cultural workers nevertheless believe it is important to safeguard universal basic income, which gives everyone equal opportunity for artistic expression.

### The road ahead to 2035

Low oil prices, a dramatic decline in investments in the petroleum sector and increased unemployment rates in many cities along the coast dominated Norwegian social development in the 2020s. It gradually became clear that Norway was in a long-term transition to something unknown. Efforts to reverse the administrative decisions to establish Viken and Troms and Finnmark received more attention in the early half of the 2020s than the question of how to promote increased value creation.

There was intense debate over several different political initiatives to increase value creation, but the population did not support any proposals to increase the retirement age, extend the workday or shorten holidays, as researchers recommended from time to time. On the contrary. Young people, in particular, pointed out that it was unreasonable that they should be the ones who had to work harder. Universal basic income was suggested as an alternative means of income protection, which entailed far less bureaucracy and would create initiative and creativity in many areas that suffered under a lack of government schemes. This dual justification — income protection and the saving of resources — gradually gained support in the population and, eventually, majority support in Parliament. The minimum level did not need to be high, but it needed to be high enough for people to live on.

A comprehensive universal basic income reform was introduced in the late 2020s, with transitional schemes in place for benefit recipients over the age of 50. In order to ensure a minimum standard of living for all while also rationalizing public administration, the government discontinued the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund and national insurance benefits for all people of employable age and replaced them with a universal basic income. The basic income was equivalent to twice the National Insurance Basic Amount (G) per person over the age of 20 and limited to Norwegian nationals resident in Norway. With this income guarantee, all other benefits paid to individuals, including grants paid to artists and to support the production of art, were discontinued. Universal basic income was popular when it was first introduced, and it immediately slowed the rate at which people moved to the big cities. Many self-employed individuals, including artists, moved out of larger cities in pursuit of fresh inspiration, new opportunities and a lower cost of living. Workplace decentralization, as well as decentralization of public authorities and resource management, were natural extensions of this, and were considered a central aspect of the Norwegian welfare model.
"Enjoy Norway" was the slogan for both Norwegian food production and for Norwegian industrial and welfare policies. Everyone was guaranteed fundamental protections, but it would be up to each local community to build a strong foundation of belonging and activity.

Gradually, the basic income scheme contributed to some people adjusting by working long hours, earning incomes far exceeding the basic income, whereas others worked less. On average, the number of people in paid work dropped, which in turn weakened economic growth.

Basic income for cultural workers came out of the Ministry of Culture's budget and led to a considerable reduction in government involvement in the ***cultural sector***. The remaining responsibilities of Arts Council Norway were transferred to the Ministry of Culture. Regions competed with each other in attracting people to move there. They used different strategies, and several regions emphasized culture as an important part of what makes a local community an attractive place to live.

# Chapter 6
# Across scenarios

In the previous chapter, we used scenario narratives to illustrate the differences between the four different futures. This chapter does the same but uses summarizing tables and projections of employment rates. Table 3 illustrates the differences between scenarios for Norwegian society as a whole, whereas Table 4 illustrates differences between scenarios for the cultural sector.

## Norwegian society

As assumed above, the Norwegian economy is stronger in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, compared to *Himmelblå* and *Vestavind*. The highest average income levels are found in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, as a result of Norwegian industry and commerce being comprised of many enterprises and industries with a generally high wage paying capacity. In *Himmelblå* and *Vestavind*, average incomes are lower, relatively speaking, as a consequence of "unfortunate" reforms that failed to improve the country's economic growth, or as a result of emphasizing other values besides economic growth.

In all scenarios, we have assumed that in the year 2035, there are jobs available for all those who want to work. There are, however, differences across scenarios in how incomes are distributed across society and in how much those in employment work. The differences in income are smallest in *Lykkeland*, where average incomes are high, and support for collective solutions is the highest. Support for collective solutions is also high in *Himmelblå*, but in this scenario, we have a universal basic income scheme. Universal basic income is a form of income guarantee with no return service required. Basic income is very expensive and limits the scope for other political measures. However, the basic income is so low that most people seek other sources of additional income. Nevertheless, basic income does afford some people the opportunity to pursue their own interests.

Centralization is assumed to be strongest in *Lykkeland* and *Stjernekamp*. In *Lykkeland*, digitalization in the public sector, including the health and care services sector, has reduced demand for labour in rural areas. At the same time, programmes aimed at developing technology-based industry have strengthened industry development in and near big cities. Centralization is weakest in *Himmelblå*, where the introduction of universal basic income has led to many people choosing or being forced to live outside the cities.

↘ Table 3 – Summary of different societal outcomes in the different scenarios

| | Lykkeland | Stjernekamp | Vestavind | Himmelblå |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Driving forces** | Strong economic growth. High degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Strong economic growth. Low degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Weak economic growth. Low degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Weak economic growth. High degree of acceptance of collective solutions. |
| **Economic growth** | The need for transition has been resolved through government initiatives and programmes, especially within competence-building, digitalization and rationalization. The transition was a success, and average incomes in 2035 are assumed to be higher than in *Himmelblå* and *Vestavind*. | The need for transition has been resolved through industry and investment-friendly policies, in the form of both regulations and tax policies (lower taxes). The transition was a success, and average incomes in 2035 are assumed to be higher than in all the other scenarios. | Attempt to resolve the need for transition through industry-friendly policies and lower taxes. However, the policies have failed to generate growth. Public sector reforms weakened rather than stimulated competence building and R&D. Economic growth is slowing and assumed to be lower than in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*. | Attempt to resolve the need for transition through collective solutions and universal basic income. Economic growth is slowing and assumed to be lower than in the scenarios *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*. |
| **Settlement pattern** | Strong centralization, driven by both public sector rationalization and public funding infrastructure. Digitalization and growth in technology and knowledge-based industries reinforce the attraction of urban areas. | Strong centralization, driven by rationalization and digitalization. Centralization a result of knowledge-based companies localizing in and around cities. | Better job opportunities in cities, but several strong centres of industry outside large cities. Cities with less industry are just as attractive as the largest cities. Many people cannot afford to live in the cities. | Better job opportunities in cities, but considerable industry activity outside large cities. For many people universal basic income is their main or only source of income, and there is a general drive to "populate the entire country" More so than in the other scenarios, *Himmelblå* has realized growth in tourism, culture and service provision in rural Norway. This scenario has the most geographically distributed settlement pattern. |
| **Economic inequality** | Least. | Relatively large. | Relatively large. | Medium |
| **Public Sector perspective** | High degree of centralization, digitalization and automation in the public sector. | Public services still offered where people live. Some use of technology and privatization of health and care services. | Some digitalization and automation in the public sector, limited by economic constraints on publicly funded services. | Public services still offered where people live. Welfare technology solutions are imported. Private welfare services are permitted, and there is a wide range of options. |

## Cultural sector

The societal driving forces played out in the different narratives are assumed to affect the cultural sector both directly and indirectly, as shown in Table 4.

In *Lykkeland* and *Stjernekamp*, digitalization and rationalization in the public sector means that people increasingly live in cities, which in turn means that demand for cultural activities becomes an urban phenomenon. Consequently, this is where most cultural workers live. In these futures, finding your audience can pose a challenge. It is also difficult for institutions to recruit cultural workers, as these will have solid job opportunities elsewhere or in other industries. Strong economic growth is a central driving force in cities providing the most varied cultural services.

We assume that the cultural sector will be more exposed to competition in *Stjernekamp* and *Vestavind*. By more exposed to competition, we mean that public funding is less important within the cultural sector. Revenues from visitors, contributions from financial investors and other sources of funding make up a larger share of the artist economy, relatively speaking.

Public allocations to the cultural sector are assumed to be the highest in *Lykkeland*, measured in kroner. National cultural policy is central in *Lykkeland*. The dominant role of the government in cultural policy leads, in part, to a reduction in tax revenue and increased municipal care costs, but also to the government assuming responsibility for large and expensive national initiatives, e.g. to ensure cultural workers get wage increases on par with the rest of the population. In *Lykkeland*, many people will be able to afford to buy art and attend cultural events, and the government is also prioritizing art and culture as a common good. Overall, this "double" funding (considerable private and public funding) leads to a stronger focus on culture and a higher number of professional cultural workers in this scenario than in the others.

As a result of institutional funding and universal basic income, the government's expenditures on culture will also be high in *Himmelblå*, but decentralization of cultural budgets gives regions greater autonomy in defining how to prioritize activities and institutions, and the introduction of a universal basic income means artists have greater freedom to define their own artistic production. As an extension of this, we could argue that thanks to universal basic income, any person who wishes to pursue their art now has an opportunity to do so. This virtually unlimited opportunity to spend time on artistic production in *Himmelblå* is the main argument for the great diversity of creativity in this scenario. The picture is not universally positive, however: In *Himmelblå* it can also be challenging to secure public funding for large projects.

As the economy is stronger in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, the public's willingness to pay will also be greater in these scenarios. On the flip side, free time is also "more costly", in the form of lost income. People of working age are therefore very conscious of how they choose to spend their time, and different recreational activities compete for the attention of the average person.

In *Vestavind*, average incomes are lower, but there is also considerable economic inequality. The cultural sector has considerable range in *Vestavind*, but the scope of cultural production and the number of professional cultural worker is nevertheless assumed to be lower than in the other scenarios. This is because public sector cultural budgets and household finances are much more limited.

↘ Table 4 – Summary of different outcomes for the cultural sector in the various scenarios

| | Lykkeland | Stjernekamp | Vestavind | Himmelblå |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Driving forces** | Strong economic growth. High degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Strong economic growth. Low degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Weak economic growth. Low degree of acceptance of collective solutions. | Weak economic growth. High degree of acceptance of collective solutions. |
| **Audience** | Audience has a relatively high willingness to pay. Recreation and experiencing things with friends and family are important motivations for cultural consumption. Time is a central constraint for audiences of working age. People appreciate a diverse selection of cultural services, even if they do not take advantage of them. Widespread use of Norwegian services. | Audiences split in two: those who prefer popular culture, and those drawn to brilliance and uniqueness as status markers. Time is the central constraint for audiences of working age. Switching between Norwegian and international services, provided digitally or in person. | Audiences somewhat less willing to pay than in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, but will attend cultural events in person, also as status markers. Motivation for cultural consumption varies considerably. Some are motivated by status, others by community with others, and yet others use culture as a platform for criticising social development. | Audiences somewhat less willing to pay than in *Stjernekamp* and *Lykkeland*, but have more time to attend cultural events in person. Community of people and co-creation key motivation for cultural consumption. Culture as meeting place and cultural activity as a hallmark of attractive local communities. |
| **Cultural policy** | Active cultural policy based on culture as a collective good demanded by the population. Strong centralization of cultural policy. Cultural sector not insulated from demands of rationalization, representation and relevance. | Goal of promoting "the best" dominating all policy, including cultural policy. Public grants and programmes focus on the presumed best artists with international potential. Some protection of allocations to cultural heritage protection. Public incentives used to trigger private investments. | Cultural policy not prominent, and culture not a central consideration in national priorities. The presumed best artists in artistic fields with the highest earning potential are prioritized. Some protection of allocations to cultural heritage protection. | Cultural policy is perceived as important, based on the principle that cultural activity is central to a good life. Two main pillars: Government assumes responsibility for income protection (universal basic income) and allocates funds to the regions for the purpose of promoting attractive local communities. Regions are responsible for actual priorities in funding of cultural activities. |
| **Cultural institutions** | National cultural institutions play a central role in increasing cultural services and safeguarding services not provided by the market. | Cultural institutions are specialized, aimed at discerning Norwegian and international audiences. They are attractive employers for both Norwegians and foreign nationals, but competition for jobs is fierce. | Cultural institutions are relatively few in number, limited to institutions deemed to have national significance. Economy dependent on combining public grants with high ticket prices and donations from private patrons of the arts and commercial partners. | NRK (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation) is the most important cultural institution, disseminating activities from all over the country. Several smaller regional institutions, with regional partial funding. National institutions funded under national budget and play a role in promoting larger projects, but economy limits opportunities. |
| **Cultural workers** | Highest number of cultural workers compared to the other scenarios, as a result of high willingness to pay and national prioritization of culture, but number lower than *Himmelblå* if we include amateurs and volunteers. | Industry characterized by a high degree of professionalization — few amateurs and volunteers.<br>Fewer cultural workers than in the other scenarios. | Limited to those with a strong passion for the arts, with some making a solid income and others not. More than in *Stjernekamp*, but fewer than in *Lykkeland*. | Highest number of cultural workers overall, but fewer professionals than in *Lykkeland*. Universal basic income has provided cultural workers with fundamental security, and many are attracted to culture as a meaningful activity. No clear distinction between amateurs and professionals. |
| **Cultural discourse** | Less prominent in the public discourse in 2035 after years of debates over closing cultural centres, libraries, etc. in the districts.<br>Some critics question the dominant role of the government and the autonomy of the arts. | Less prominent in the public discourse in 2035 after a period of discussing the differences between true culture and commercial culture. Some question whether the slow arts have become a purely academic exercise — a luxury reserved for the elite. | After a period of debate over whether free and inaccessible niche arts are at risk of going extinct as public funding is drying up and the market is given free rein, there is little debate over cultural policies in 2035. The debate is highly polarized, which affects the cultural discourse too — various parts of the cultural sector criticize each other's art to promote different views and values. | After a period of positive reports on "everything that is happening" in the wake of the introduction of universal basic income, there is increased criticism of the lack of funding for large projects. Cultural workers in urban areas in particular are advocating for new initiatives in cultural policy. Some question the quality of Norwegian cultural production. |

# Projection of employment rates for cultural workers in the scenarios

There is, of course, considerable uncertainty associated with assumptions of the types of cultural expressions audiences and wider society will demand, and which the Norwegian cultural sector will, in turn, produce. We do, however, assume that our selected driving forces will affect the size and composition of the cultural sector, as indicated by the number of cultural workers.

In the period 2015–2019, the employment rate for cultural workers increased by 1.7 percent per year. Based on our scenario narratives, we have projected the number of cultural workers for each scenario. These projections should not be interpreted as exact projections, but rather as illustrations of how these four different futures could play out. As previously mentioned, the many participants in the cultural sector will have a much greater societal impact than the number of professional cultural workers within the sector would indicate.

As the basis for our projections, we calculated a baseline scenario and then corrected this by taking into account the differences in our four different futures.

The baseline scenario is based on projected population growth, where Statistics Norway's medium alternative for projections of the working age population is applied as the baseline for total employment rates in the years to come. The baseline scenario takes into account that employment rates in individual sectors cannot support infinite growth, but must take into account the demand for labour in other sectors. The baseline scenario is primarily based on purely mechanical projections based on historic employment rate trends, both in the cultural sector and in other sectors. For example, the baseline scenario takes into account continued employment rate growth in the health and care services sector, ICT and seafood. We have also made manual adjustments wherever the mechanical projections are not in line with expected developments. This is particularly true for the petroleum and petroleum supplier sectors, as well as for construction. The former is expected to decrease in the years to come, whereas the construction sector is expected to make up 6–8 percent of the economy over time.

With the baseline scenario as our starting point, we adjust the projected growth for cultural workers overall, as well as for three subcategories of cultural workers, see Table 1 in Appendix 1.

- Employment rates in artistic activity and entertainment
- Employment rates in specialized distribution of music and literature
- Employment rates for employees in cultural institutions and organizations, i.e., operative employees in various cultural institutions, like museums, theatres, archives and libraries, including administrative employees and support staff (lighting technicians, stage workers, etc.)

As these employment statistics do not include volunteers and persons working with culture as a secondary occupation, the projections will not include these people. The projections should therefore be interpreted as including only cultural workers whose work in these industries is their main occupation. They should not be interpreted as projections of society's overall need for or appreciation of cultural workers. Cultural workers employed in organizations categorized under different industries, such as the media industry, film industry, etc., have not been included in these projections, given our limitation of the cultural sector. Cultural goods may also be provided by organizations and cultural workers located in other countries.

Industry composition is projected with a ten-year moving average, illustrating the economic trend. This means that employment rate projections will be linear, as opposed to historical figures, where the observable employment rate is influenced by short-term cyclical upswings or downturns, like the coronavirus pandemic, financial crises, oil price reductions, etc. Historical data indicate that cultural sector employment rates (as main occupation) vary considerably from year to year. This indicates considerable turnover, with many employees entering and leaving the sector by transferring to (or from) organizations or businesses registered as different industries.

In our projections, we have applied a shared baseline scenario for employment rate trends for the next two years, to explicitly account for the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The most recent employment rate figures are from 2019. Our projections must therefore estimate the overall effect of the coronavirus pandemic on employment rates for our selected industries. Based on preliminary figures for employment rate trends up to Q3 2020, we have assumed that total employment rates will go down in 2020, compared to 2019. We have assumed a 30 percent reduction for artists, a 20 percent reduction for institutional operations, and a 5 percent reduction within specialized distribution of music and literature. With the development of vaccine and increased likelihood of fewer restrictions as we get further into 2021, we assume that the population will want to start taking advantage of cultural services again. Therefore, we assume that employment rates will almost, but not quite, recover to the same level as 2019.

From 2022 onward, we play out the qualitative characteristics of each scenario in our projections, with a projection trajectory either over, at or below our baseline scenario.

We have assumed that the employment rate increases the most in *Lykkeland*, see Figure 9. In *Lykkeland*, we have projected a 2 percent annual growth for the period 2022–2035. This is significantly higher than the growth observed in the period 2015–2019. Overall, the employment rate for cultural workers has increased by approximately 30 percent in 2035 compared to 2019. The growth is particularly strong among artists and institutional operation, whereas we expect the employment rate within specialized distribution to drop, albeit less dramatically than in the other scenarios.

In the *Himmelblå* scenario, too, projections indicate significant increase in employment rates for the industries, approximately at the level observed in the period leading up to 2019. Overall, we have a 2 percent annual growth in employment rates for the period 2022–2025. In this scenario, this growth in the number of cultural workers is attributable to the introduction of universal basic income and also partly by increased employment in museum and cultural heritage activities, which is attributable to an increased emphasis on cultural meeting places in the regions.

In *Vestavind*, our projections also predict some growth in employment rates, albeit considerably more moderate. Here, we take into account that economic growth is weak, which will affect the financial freedom of both government and private households, in combination with a passive cultural policy.

In *Stjernekamp*, the employment rate decreases by 1.8 percent per year, which means that the employment rate in 2035 is approximately 30 percent lower than it is today. The economy is strong in *Stjernekamp*, but acceptance of collective solutions is low. This entails a greater degree of market orientation and subsequent stronger global and national specialization.
At the same time, Norwegian labour is in high demand in other industries.

↘ Figure 9 – Projection of employment rate for cultural workers in the four scenarios, by main activity




Source: Economics Norway

↘ Figure 10 – Projection of employment within artistic activities




Source: Economics Norway

↘ Figure 11 – Projection of employment within specialized distribution of music and literature (publishers and bookstores)




↘ Figure 12 – Projection of employment in enterprises and cultural institutions




Source: Economics Norway

↘ Table 5 – Observed and exemplified annual growth rates for employment, by employment group

| | Cultural workers in total | Employed in artistic activities | Others employed in enterprises and institutions (theatre, museums, archives, libraries, etc.) | Employed within specialized distribution of music and literature (publishers, bookstores, etc.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Observed 2015–2019 | 0,7 % | 1,5 % | 0,7 % | -3,0 % |
| Stjernekamp | -2,6 % | -1,7 % | -3,9 % | -3,9 % |
| Lykkeland | 1,9 % | 2,6 % | 2,3 % | -1,7 % |
| Himmelblå | 1,7 % | 2,3 % | 1,7 % | -0,8 % |
| Vestavind | -1,1 % | -0,4 % | -1,2 % | -3,9 % |

Source: Statistics Norway, Table 11687, projection by Economics Norway.

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# Appendix 1 Tables

## ↘ Table 6 – Industry codes included in the "cultural sector"

| Segment | NACE | Industry | Activity (EN category) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Literature | 47.61 | Retail sale of books in specialized stores | Distribution |
| Literature | 58.11 | Book publishing | Distribution |
| Literature | 58.19 | Other publishing activities | Distribution |
| Literature | 18.14 | Binding and related services | Distribution |
| Literature | 91.011 | Libraries and archives activities | Institutional operation |
| Literature | 91.012 | Special and research libraries activities | Institutional operation |
| Literature | 90.034 | Independent artistic activity within literature | Artistic activity |
| Music | 59.2 | Sound recording and music publishing activities | Distribution |
| Music | 47.594 | Retail sale of musical instruments and scores in specialised stores | Distribution |
| Music | 90.011 | Performing artists and music entertainment activities | Artistic activity |
| Music | 90.02 | Other entertainment activities[1]) | Artistic activity |
| Music | 90.032 | Independent artistic activity within music | Artistic activity |
| Dramatic art | 90.012 | Performing artists and entertainment activities within dramatic art | Artistic activity |
| Dramatic art | 90.019 | Performing artists and other entertainment activities | Artistic activity |
| Dramatic art | 90.033 | Independent artistic activity within dramatic art | Artistic activity |
| Dramatic art | 90.04 | Operation of arts facilities | Institutional operation |
| Dramatic art | 74.2 | Photographic activities | Artistic activity |
| Dramatic art | 90.031 | Independent artistic activity within visual art | Artistic activity |
| Museums and cultural heritage | 91.021 | Art museums activities | Institutional operation |
| Museums and cultural heritage | 91.022 | Social history museums activities | Institutional operation |
| Museums and cultural heritage | 91.023 | Natural history museums activities | Institutional operation |
| Museums and cultural heritage | 91.029 | Other museums activities | Institutional operation |

Statistics Norway, Employment, register-based, Table 11606: Employed persons, 4th quarter
Note: Employment statistics cited above only cover employed persons by main occupation and therefore do not include persons whose main occupation is in enterprises registered under other industry divisions.
[1]) This class includes support activities to performing arts for production of live theatrical presentations, concerts and opera or dance productions and other stage productions: . activities of directors, producers, stage-set designers and builders, scene shifters, lighting engineers etc. Gallery employees are classified as cultural workers but would not be included in the number of cultural workers in official statistics, as gallery employees are defined as "Other retail sale of goods in non-specialised stores". This group also includes other specialized stores besides galleries.

## ↘ Table 7 – Employment in the cultural sector

| Industry | Division | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | Change 2015–2019 | Change 2018–2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Literature | Binding and related services | 184 | 196 | 178 | 162 | 128 | -8,7 % | -5,7 % |
| | Retail sale of books in specialized stores | 3 302 | 3 160 | 3 117 | 2 967 | 2 578 | -6,0 % | -3,5 % |
| | Special and research libraries activities | 783 | 752 | 876 | 827 | 849 | 2,0 % | 0,7 % |
| | Libraries and archives activities | 2 650 | 2 619 | 2 645 | 2 662 | 2 701 | 0,5 % | 0,4 % |
| | Other publishing activities | 328 | 298 | 281 | 290 | 305 | -1,8 % | 1,3 % |
| | Independent artistic activity within literature | 1 728 | 1 642 | 1 716 | 2 004 | 1 901 | 2,4 % | -1,3 % |
| | Book publishing | 1 780 | 1 837 | 1 956 | 1 887 | 1 725 | -0,8 % | -2,2 % |
| **Literature total** | | **10 755** | **10 504** | **10 769** | **10 799** | **10 187** | **-1,3 %** | **-1,4 %** |
| Museums and cultural heritage | Social history museums activities | 2 595 | 2 725 | 2 780 | 2 922 | 2 871 | 2,6 % | -0,4 % |
| | Art museums activities | 711 | 712 | 751 | 762 | 812 | 3,4 % | 1,6 % |
| | Other museums activities | 24 | 25 | 39 | 44 | 36 | 10,7 % | -4,9 % |
| | Natural history museums activities | 342 | 345 | 316 | 345 | 370 | 2,0 % | 1,8 % |
| **Museums and cultural heritage total** | | **3 672** | **3 807** | **3 886** | **4 073** | **4 089** | **2,7 %** | **0,1 %** |
| Music | Retail sale of musical instruments and scores in specialised stores | 307 | 324 | 313 | 312 | 295 | -1,0 % | -1,4 % |
| | Sound recording and music publishing activities | 598 | 586 | 668 | 708 | 725 | 4,9 % | 0,6 % |
| | Independent artistic activity within music | 320 | 302 | 338 | 410 | 371 | 3,8 % | -2,5 % |
| | Other entertainment activities | 2 023 | 2 051 | 2 143 | 2 435 | 2 602 | 6,5 % | 1,7 % |
| | Performing artists and music entertainment activities | 3 470 | 3 261 | 3 333 | 4 078 | 3 927 | 3,1 % | -0,9 % |
| **Music total** | | **6 718** | **6 524** | **6 795** | **7 943** | **7 920** | **4,2 %** | **-0,1 %** |
| Dramatic art | Operation of arts facilities | 1 030 | 1 091 | 1 144 | 1 217 | 1 248 | 4,9 % | 0,6 % |
| | Independent artistic activity within dramatic art | 365 | 378 | 363 | 406 | 162 | -18,4 % | -20,5 % |
| | Performing artists and other entertainment activities | 250 | 247 | 243 | 274 | 314 | 5,9 % | 3,5 % |
| | Performing artists and entertainment activities within dramatic art | 3 214 | 3 193 | 3 340 | 3 603 | 3 879 | 4,8 % | 1,9 % |
| **Dramatic art total** | | **4 859** | **4 909** | **5 090** | **5 500** | **5 603** | **3,6 %** | **0,5 %** |
| Visual art | Photographic activities | 2 067 | 1 950 | 1 903 | 2 132 | 2 099 | 0,4 % | -0,4 % |
| | Independent artistic activity within visual art | 2 002 | 1 815 | 1 896 | 2 301 | 2 335 | 3,9 % | 0,4 % |
| **Visual art total** | | **4 069** | **3 765** | **3 799** | **4 433** | **4 434** | **2,2 %** | **0,0 %** |
| **Total** | | **30 073** | **29 509** | **30 339** | **32 748** | **32 233** | **1,7 %** | **-0,4 %** |

Source: Statistics Norway, Employment, register-based, Table 11606: Employed persons, 4th quarter
Note: Employment statistics cited above only cover employed persons by main occupation and therefore do not include persons whose main occupation is in enterprises registered under other industry divisions.

# Appendix 2 Workshop participants

| First name(s) | Last name | Institution |
|---|---|---|
| Hans | Antonsen | Det Norske Teatret |
| Trud | Berg | Stormen Library |
| Stein | Bjelland | Fond for lyd og bilde |
| Shanti | Brahmachari | TekstLab and Artxhange |
| Danby | Choi | Subject |
| Helene | Duckert | Visual artist |
| Audun | Eckhoff | Spekter |
| Kristenn | Einarsson | Norwegian Publishers Association |
| Unn-Charlotte | Engelmark | Ministry of Culture |
| Fredrik | Forssman | Municipality of Tromsø/Committee Chair Arts Council Norway |
| Karianne Bjellås | Gilje | Bergesen Foundation |
| Ida | Habbestad | Norwegian Critics' Association |
| Lars Petter | Hagen | Oslo Philharmonic/Council Chair Arts Council Norway |
| Ingrid Elisabeth | Handeland | Audiences Norway |
| Thea | Hjelmeland | Musician/artist |
| Astrid | Holen | Retired |
| Peder | Horgen | Scenekunst Sør/Council Member Arts Council Norway |
| Hege | Imerslund | Relief Fund for Visual Artists |
| Merete Hermansen | Jonvik | University of Stavanger |
| Camara Lundestad | Joof | Dramatic artist/Council Member Arts Council Norway |
| Maria Mediaas | Jørstad | Talent Norge |
| Marit Nerås | Krogsæter | Møre og Romsdal County (SP) |
| Wolman | Luciano | Tabanka Dance Ensemble |
| Deise | Nunes | Dramatic artist/Committee Chair Arts Council Norway |
| Tanja | Orning | Norwegian Academy of Music/Committee Chair Arts Council Norway |
| Thomas Talawa | Prestø | Tabanka Dance Ensemble |
| Liv | Ramskjær | Norwegian Museums Association |
| Hans Ole | Rian | Creo |
| Pouria | Ruhi | LastCall |
| Hege Knarvik | Sande | Norwegian Cultural Forum |
| Elizabeth | Sellevold | Forlaget Vigmostad og Bjørke |
| Tone | Slenes | Ivar Aasen Centre |
| Yngve | Slettholm | Kopinor |
| Morten | Spjøtvold | Museene i Sør-Trøndelag |
| Ruben | Steinum | Association of Norwegian Visual Artists |

| First name(s) | Last name | Institution |
|---|---|---|
| Trude | Storheim | Vossa Jazz |
| Sigurd Sandmo | Sverdrup | Royal Norwegian Palace/Council Member Arts Council Norway |
| Trude Gomnæs | Ugelstad | Sørlandet Museum of Art/Committee Chair, Government Grants for Artists |
| Maria | Utsi | Freelancer/Council Member Arts Council Norway |
| Jorunn | Veiteberg | Freelancer/Council Member Arts Council Norway |
| Idun | Vik | Cornerteateret |
| Margit | Walsø | NORLA |
| Sandra Márjá | West | Riddu Riđđu Festival |
| Tone | Østerdal | Norwegian Live Music Association |

**Representing Economics Norway (EN)**

| | |
|---|---|
| Marte Marie | Frisell |
| Markus | Gyene |
| Rolf | Røtnes |
| Maja | Tofteng |

**Representing Arts Council Norway administration**

| | |
|---|---|
| Ellen | Aslaksen |
| Renate Enemark | Bergersen |
| Sara | Cools |
| Mari | Johansen |
| Mariann | Komissar |
| Andreas Skauen | Pedersen |
| Birgitte | Solbu |
| Annelene | Svingen |